MAY 16 1987

384-G

D214.2:7644

Marine Corps Institute

Marine Barracks · Washington, D.C.

ORIGINAL

Amphibious Warfare School

Nonresident Program

Amphibious Raids

MCI 7644

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Amphibious Raids

MCI 7644

Marine Corps Institute, Washington, D.C.

1987

Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, Va.

I

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

The spectacular failure of the U. S. rescue mission in Iran startled the world. Nevertheless, the Iran incident of April 1980 did focus the attention of military personnel and the general public on the planning and execution of raids.

International law defines a raid as "an invasion, by armed forces, unauthorized and unrecognized by any state into the territory of a state which is at peace." Hence, the effort by U. S. Special Forces to liberate the American hostages imprisoned in the U. S. Embassy in Tehran was an invasion, since despite the outlaw acts of the Iranian Government, no formal declaration of war had been issued by either side. Moreover, the armed attack was authorized by the commander-in-chief and, therefore, the U. S., under existing international law, would be obligated to pay compensation for any loss of Iranian lives or damage to Iranian property occurring during the attack. However, in a world where independent individuals, private groups and even sovereign nations consistently violate the traditional terms of international law, states, in order to defend their citizens, have increasingly turned to officially authorized armed action. Consequently, in a world where violence rules and personnel and public anarchy prevails, a re-definition of raid under international law is needed.

Raids are as old as Abraham (Genesis 14:14-16). Over the centuries the recovery of sequestered persons or property was the primary objective. But beginning with the nineteenth century raids tended to take on a different character. Rather than recovery, the intention was increasingly punative. A limited operation, by small forces with a specific objective became the norm.

The objective of a raid may be either political or military. The British burning of Washington, D.C. (1814), John Brown's raid on Harpers ferry (1859), the Fenian's on Ft. Erie, Canada (1866), Col. Sandoval's on Venezuela (1856), Dr. Jameson's in Transvaal (1895-96), Panchol Villa's on Las Cruces, New Mexico (1916), Gabriel d'Annunzio's on Flume (1919), and Otto Skorzeny's rescue of Benito Mussolini in Italy (1943) all had political intentions as well as repercussions. Sherman's March to the Sea (1864-65) during the U. S. Civil War was a raid on a grand scale with both political and military objectives, whereas his Confederate counterpart, General Nathan B. Forrests' operations were markedly more limited and militarily oriented. Raids by Boer kommandos during the South African War (1899-1902) were characteristic of that conflict as were the early operations against the Ottomans by T. E. Lawrence in Arabia and those by his Prussian parallel, Gen. Von Lettow-Vorbeck against the Allies in Southern Africa during World War I (1914-1918). All of these actions were, however, essentially land operations and, perhaps, the modern concept of raids by combined forces - air, land and sea - commenced with the British attempt to blockade the German submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend (1918).

World War II (1939-1945) opened with a series of strikes by British Commandos against Nazi occupied Europe. As the war lengthened, however, raids took on increasingly humanitarian, rather than military aspects. Most of these efforts were directed at liberating Allied prisoners of war in Japanese or German captivity. Drops by elements of the U. S. Eleventh and Eighty-second Airborne Divisions in the Philippines and Germany during the closing months of the conflict were indicative of the new trend. Hence, as World War II terminated the character of raids changed. Raids took on a more modern humanitarian, rather than military meaning. As in the days of Abraham, rescue and relief, not destruction and punishment, emerged as the objectives.

Lewis A. Tambs

Arizona State University
Tempe, Arizona
21 May 81

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

This information is provided to assist you in completing your course/program of study. For additional information, refer to the MCI Catalog.

1. Course Activity

a. Unit Activity. All program packages contain preprinted final examination answer sheets (MCI-DP37) for each course. Complete and submit the DP37 to your training officer/MCO who records on the Notice of Enrollment Card (MCI-R5) the date the answer sheet (primary or alternate) was mailed to MCI for grading. "Instructions for Administrating examination" and "Exam Validation" portions of the answer sheet do not apply to PME students.

b. Receipt of examinations at MCI. Examinations submitted on DP 37 are mechanically graded. If you fail the primary examination, an alternate examination is automatically mailed. You must successfully complete all course examinations with a passing score of 75 percent in order to pass the program. MCI enters the completion in the Marine Corps manpower management system (MMS). If you fail both the primary and the alternate examination, an administration notice card (MCI-R6) is forwarded to your unit. The training officer makes an entry on the MCI-R5 card and has the SRB clerk note your service record book/officer qualification record (SRB/OQR). You are then administratively deleted from the remaining courses of the program. If you still desire to complete certificates to receive prior credit.

c. Disenrollment. Disenrollment occurs upon reaching the course completion deadline (CCD) date or the adjusted course completion deadline (ACCD) date (6-month-extension) for the program. reenrollment will be granted upon request within 1 year after disenrollment if a reenrollment was not previously granted for the program.

(1) You will be disenrolled if you do not complete your course by the course completion deadline (CCD). To avoid this, ask your training officer/MCO to request a six month extension allowing you more time to complete your course/program.

(2) If you already have a 6-month extension and still cannot complete your course by your adjusted course completion deadline, you will automatically be disenrolled from the program. If you wish to continue the program, ask your training officer/MCO to reenroll you. You are allowed only one extension and one reenrollment.

d. Program Completion. A certificate of completion and a letter of transmittal with the course grade are forwarded to the commanding officer of each Marine who successfully completes a PME course. The commanding officer has the completion recorded in the Marine's SRB or OQR and presents the certificate to the student. The certificate and the letter are mailed directly to the supervisor of non-Marines and a daily completions listing is sent to the Marine Corps Reserve Force, Administrative center, Kansas City, MO for individual ready reservists (IRR). Upon successful completion of all courses, a program diploma is forwarded to your commanding officer who presents it to you at an appropriate ceremony. Notification of completion for Air Force students is sent to the Extension Course Institute, Gunther Air Force Station, Alabama at the end of each month.

2. Reserve Retirement Credits. Reserve retirement credits are awarded only to inactive duty personnel upon successful completion of each course. Reserve retirement credits are earned at the rate of one credit for every 3 hours of estimated student effort. The total number of reserve retirement credits are indicated on the course title page and are awarded upon the successful completion of the course. Credits are not awarded for MCI study performed during drill periods if they are also awarded for drill attendance.

3. Mail-Time Delay. (See current MCI Catalog for an updated mail-time delay chart.)

4. Information/Assistance From MCI. Further information is found in the current MCI Catalog. If you have a question about the content of a course/program, call commercial (202) 433-4109/4110 or autovon 288-4109/4110. For administrative assistance, use the enclosed MCI-R11/14 or the unit activity report (UAR) or call commercial (202) 433-2299 or autovon 288-4175.

5. Student Data. If you need to request a change to your student data in the MCI database, e.g., name, rank, change of address, use the MCI-R11 (old MCI-R14) Student Request/Inquiry located at the end of each text.

6. Course Evaluation Questionnaire. Please take a few minutes to complete the course questionnaire located at the end of each course.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

PROGRAM: THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SCHOOL NON-RESIDENT PROGRAM

COURSE: AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

VOLUME: AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS MCI-7644 (1987)

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 3 hours

RESERVE RETIREMENT CREDITS: 1

PURPOSE: To provide you with a working knowledge of the fundamentals of amphibious raids.

SCOPE: A detailed introduction to amphibious raids to include comparison with an amphibious assault, classification and purpose, morale effect, raids as separate and supporting operations, factors affecting the raid force, principles of amphibious raids, organization, command relationships, intelligence, planning staffs, scheme of maneuver, transportation, choice of landing place, selecting dates, timing the operation, fire support, ship-to-shore movement, withdrawal and reembarkation, logistic, training, rehearsals, security, and night landing techniques.

INFORMATION

COURSE: AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS

MATERIALS PROVIDED: Course text, Amphibious Raids MCI-7644 (1987)

INFORMATION:

1. The "Estimated Student Effort" (3 hours) shown on the course title page indicates the time the average student needs to complete the course. This includes time required to study text material and complete chapter exercises and the final examination.

2. The material contained in this course was derived from various doctrine publications. You can achieve a broader understanding of the subjects presented by referring to the following manuals:

OH 0-2	MARINE CORPS DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS
LFM 01	MARINE CORPS LANDING FORCE MANUAL 01
FMFM 0-1	MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE DOCTRINE
FMFM 2-1	INTELLIGENCE
FMFM 3-1	COMMAND AND STAFF ACTION
FMFM 8-1	SPECIAL OPERATIONS

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

PROGRAM OUTLINE

Upon completion of Amphibious Raids, your status and future study requirements in the Amphibious Warfare School Nonresident Program (AWSNP) will be:

COURSE	ESTIMATED HOURS	RESERVE RETIREMENT CREDITS
Fleet Marine Force Organization	6	2
Marine Aviation	9	3
Fire Support	12	4
Staff Functioning	15	5
Intelligence	7	2
Combat Service Support	30	10
Communications	3	1
Nuclear and Chemical Support	9	3
Mechanized Operations	9	3
Tactical Fundamentals	10	3
Infantry Operations	24	8
Professional Communications	11	4
Operational Decisions in Amphibious Operations	21	7
Communications and Fire Support Planning	8	3
Combat Service Support in Amphibious Operations	12	4
AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS	3	1
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations	3	1

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAV	-	Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ATF	-	Amphibious Task Force
BLT	-	Battalion Landing Team
BZO	-	Battle Sight Zero
CAP	-	Combat Air Patrol
CAS	-	Close Air Support
CATF	-	Commander Amphibious Task Force
CLF	-	Commander Landing Force
CS	-	Standard U.S. Riot Control Munition (tear gas)
CSS	-	Combat Service Support
E&E	-	Escape and Evasion
EEI	-	Essential Elements of Information
EMCON	-	Electronic Emissions Control
EW	-	Electronic Warfare
INTSUMS	-	Intelligence Summaries
IR	-	Intelligence Requirement
KIA	-	Killed In Action
LF	-	Landing Force
LOD	-	Line of Departure
LTI	-	Limited Technical Inspection
LZ	-	Landing Zone
MAU	-	Marine Amphibious Unit
NCOIC	-	Noncommissioned Officer In Charge
NGF	-	Naval Gunfire
OA	-	Objective Area
OIR	-	Other Intelligence Requirement
OP	-	Observation Post
ORP	-	Objective Rally Point
POL	-	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POW	-	Prisoner of War
PYRO	-	Pyrotechnics
RED	-	Record of Emergency Data
TAD	-	Temporary Additional Duty
TG	-	Attack Group
T/O	-	Table of Organization
WIA	-	Wounded in Action

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS	1
CHAPTER EXERCISE	26
SOLUTIONS TO CHAPTER EXERCISE	28
APPENDIX A. RAID EXERCISE CHECKLIST	A-1
APPENDIX B. THE MAKIN RAID; THE MAKIN ISLAND RAID	B-1

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

CHAPTER 1

AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 4 hours

SCOPE: Comparison with an amphibious assault, classification and purpose, morale effect, raids as separate and supporting operations, factors affecting the raid force, principles, organization, command relationships, intelligence, planning staffs, scheme of maneuver, transportation, choice of landing place, selecting dates, timing the operation, fire support, ship-to-shore movement, withdrawal, reembarkation, logistics, training, rehearsals, security, night landing techniques, raid exercise checklist, and appendices which include the Dieppe raid, and the Makin Island raids.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon completion of this chapter, you will be able to:

1. List the five intelligence requirements for an amphibious raid.
2. State the two basic differences which define the amphibious raid from the amphibious assault.
3. State the two classifications of amphibious raids.
4. List the nine steps in planning an amphibious raid.
5. State the basic concept of logistics support for an amphibious raid.
6. List the five functional elements of a raid force.
7. List the seven purposes of an amphibious raid.
8. List the eight principles of the amphibious raid.

ASSIGNMENT

STUDY: Chapter 1

COMPLETE: Chapter 1 Exercise

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1101. INTRODUCTION

An amphibious raid is a landing from the sea on a hostile shore. It involves swift incursion into or temporary occupation of an objective and a planned withdrawal. It is planned and executed in accordance with standing amphibious procedures. The raiding force uses any combination of surface, subsurface, helicopter or transport aircraft, or parachutes to enter and exit the OA. Once the raiding force is ashore, the concept of operation provides for rapid and aggressive execution of an assigned raid task followed by the immediate withdrawal of the raiding force.

1102. COMPARISON WITH AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

The raid differs from the amphibious assault. It is of short duration and includes a planned withdrawal from the objective. Plans for a raid embody any of the following variations:

a. In small-scale raids, beaches or helicopter landing sites are selected to provide the greatest chance of achieving tactical surprise.

b. The limited duration of a raid and the possible surprise achieved may eliminate the necessity for gaining air and naval superiority within the OA.

c. Deployment of the raiding force may not be required until the assault of the objective.

d. In conjunction with a main attack, raids are conducted to strike at the enemy's seacoast positions, flanks, or rear areas.

e. Logistic support requirements are limited.

f. Communication requirements are simplified through detailed planning and rehearsals.

1103. CLASSIFICATION AND PURPOSE OF AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS

Amphibious raids may be supported to such a degree that they resemble the early stages of an amphibious assault, or they may be accomplished largely by stealth. At the same time, a raid may be an independent operation, an operation in support of another landing and/or land campaign, or in support of an air or naval operation. Regardless of the degree of support provided or the general purpose of an amphibious raid, its specific aims normally provide for any or several of the following:

a. Psychological. A raid may be conducted solely for psychological reasons; e.g., to lift the morale of friendly military personnel and civilians. Such a raid may be particularly necessary at the outset of hostilities or later if friendly forces have been in a defensive posture for a long time. Raids conducted under such circumstances may pay dividends by keeping the operating forces "offensive minded."

b. Destruction. Raids may be employed to destroy certain targets, particularly those that are not susceptible to destruction by other means. Targets for destruction may include military or industrial installations, communication facilities, and transportation facilities such as bridges and tunnels. Raids aimed at destruction may have strategic or tactical significance.

c. Harrassment. To capture or kill key personnel, raids can harass the enemy when they are directed against isolated posts, patrols, and headquarters. In addition to such specific aims, harassment of the enemy may lower the enemy's morale.

d. Reconnaissance. Amphibious raids can gather information on hydrography, terrain, and the enemy to include his dispositions, morale, strength, movement, and weapons.

e. Diversion. A raid may create a diversion in connection with a strategic or tactical deception.

f. Evacuation. The amphibious raid may be used to evacuate individuals, including agents, or material.

g. Unconventional Warfare Raid. A series of amphibious raids can be employed to establish, support, or coordinate unconventional warfare activities.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1104. MORALE EFFECT

The morale effect of raids may be far more important than their immediate operational results. A series of successful raids may significantly affect both friendly and enemy morale. In planning an amphibious raid, consider the operational importance of the raid target in light of possible morale effects. The adverse morale effect of one fiasco outweighs that of several successful raids. Therefore, the target is always one not guarded by a formidable hostile force.

1105. RAIDS AS SEPARATE OPERATIONS

a. Amphibious raids, conducted as separate operations, may be designed to accomplish the following:

(1) Destroy critical targets.

(2) Capture vital enemy equipment or personnel.

(3) Gain information.

(4) Harass the enemy.

(5) Boost the morale of local civilians and guerrilla forces.

b. Raids to Destroy Critical Targets. Amphibious raids may be conducted to destroy critical targets that air, naval gunfire, or other weapons cannot reduce. In 1942, a 13-man Norwegian raiding force, trained by the British, successfully destroyed the Vermok plant in Norway. This raid deprived the Germans of the capability to produce heavy water, and possibly prevented them from developing the atomic bomb.

c. Raids to Capture Equipment or Personnel. In May of 1944, a small party of British raiders and local guerrillas (total party of nine men) captured the German commander of Crete, General Kriepe.

d. Raids to Gain Information. The amphibious raid may be employed in situations where existing intelligence gathering means are inadequate or unreliable. In May of 1945, British raiders were landed by submarine in Malaya to determine the suitability of the beaches for an amphibious assault.

e. Raids to Harass the Enemy. Amphibious raids may be employed to harass isolated enemy forces and installations and cause the enemy to divert combat troops for security duty. British and Americans conducted numerous raids in all theaters of World War II for this purpose. During the Korean War, several raids were made on the east coast of Korea. Reports indicated that 7,000 North Koreans troops were "frozen" and over 400 miles of triple entrenchments and gun positions had been constructed as protection against these forays. Raid targets generally consisted of coastal railways, bridges, tunnels, and communication systems.

f. Raids for Morale Purposes. An amphibious raid may gain a bonus effect as a morale booster. Raiding campaigns are highly effective in encouraging guerrilla and partisan activity in an enemy occupied country. However, this activity may hurt guerrillas and partisans by intensifying counteraction. In addition to assisting the efforts of such groups, active raiding tends to divert suspicion from underground units.

1106. RAIDS IN SUPPORT OF OTHER OPERATIONS

a. Raids in support of other operations normally fall into one of the following categories:

(1) Support of a landing by a larger force.

(2) Support of naval operations.

(3) Support of air operations.

(4) Support of a land campaign.

b. Support of a Landing by a Larger Force. The amphibious raid executed to support the landing of a larger force may be designed to accomplish the following:

(1) Strike at key facilities that will disrupt or delay enemy reaction to the landing by the larger force. Raid objectives may be enemy command posts, communication centers, or transportation systems.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(2) Destroy selected enemy defenses or critical targets that air attack or naval gunfire cannot reduce.

(3) Create a diversion in a different area to draw the enemy's combat forces away from the locale of the target landing.

c. Support of Naval Operations. Raids may be employed to support naval operations by destroying or neutralizing targets such as coast artillery, guided missiles, electronic installations, submarine pens, refueling stations, drydocks, harbor defenses, and similar installations that affect friendly naval operations.

d. Support of Air Operations. Raids in support of air operations may be designed to accomplish the following:

(1) Destroy targets invulnerable to air attack.

(2) Attack key air facilities, industry, antiaircraft positions, or control systems.

(3) Locate targets and direct airstrikes from within enemy territory.

(4) Seize airfields or LZ's for temporary use by friendly aircraft.

e. Support of Land Campaign. Amphibious raids may support land campaigns by striking enemy rear installations or flanks that rest on or near seacoasts. Raids may cause the enemy to divert sizeable forces to protect his seacoast, supply lines, and rear areas.

1107. FACTORS AFFECTING THE RAIDING FORCE

The military tasks in an amphibious raid usually involve capturing an objective or objectives, holding them for a short period, and then withdrawing. Although these tasks are similar to those that are assigned in other operations, there are certain factors that are unique to amphibious raids and that affect the organization, tactics, techniques, and equipment of the raiding force.

a. Intelligence. The detailed planning necessary for an amphibious raid requires detailed intelligence. The provision of a safety margin of combat power, to compensate for lack of detailed intelligence, may detract from the raiding force's ability to achieve surprise and speed of execution. It poses additional problems in planning the landing and withdrawal of the raid force.

b. Speed. The success of a force depends upon its ability to achieve its aim before the enemy has time to react fully with his potential combat capabilities. The necessity for speed has a direct influence on the size, organization, and composition of the raid force. When either numbers of personnel or size and number of desired equipment appreciably slow the execution of the raid, the risk of employing such men and equipment is reevaluated in terms of the overall contribution they make to the execution of the raiding force mission.

c. Duration. Raids are normally of short duration. Once the OA is secured, it isn't usually necessary to hold it for a protracted period. This enables the raiding force to be lightly equipped and to take what might, in other circumstances, appear to be unwarranted risks.

d. Surprise. Surprise is important, not only with regard to the time and place of the assault but also to the size of the force that is landed. In the normal operational environment bold action by small parties may confuse the enemy and make him unduly cautious.

e. Fire Support. The amount of close fire support which the raiding force can expect in a raid is normally limited. To some extent relying on surprise, speed, and mobility can offset this.

f. Reserves. In considering the problem of a reserve for an amphibious raid, a commander is faced with conflicting requirements. On the one hand, he must have a force strong enough to accomplish the mission. On the other hand, since his force must withdraw, he does not want to bring in any unit for which there is no definite task. A reserve for a raid may be provided in the following ways:

(1) A reserve may be designated and held in a state of readiness outside the OA.

(2) A reserve may be landed in the OA.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(3) The various elements of the raiding force may be augmented to provide for unforeseen contingencies.

(4) Units participating in the assault phase of missions that are not of a continuing nature may be earmarked as the reserve.

g. Withdrawal. Withdrawal considerations affect all phases of planning. Withdrawal plans are flexible and are designed so that the raiding force can be withdrawn under any of the following tactical situations:

(1) In light contact, not surrounded.

(2) Surrounded, but in light contact.

(3) Under heavy pressure, not surrounded.

(4) Surrounded and under heavy enemy pressure

h. Logistics. Logistic outfitting of the raid force is primarily concerned with providing the minimum essential supplies and equipment required to carry out the assigned mission. Detailed planning and coordination are required because of the short duration and "one-shot" nature of the operation.

i. Deception. The senior authority in the OA normally directs the tactical deception. It may be employed to assist the raid force commander in accomplishing his tactical mission with a minimum loss of men, material, and time. The tactical deception planning for an amphibious raid is initiated at the raiding force level to ensure that it supports the tactical plans for the raid. It should embrace deception that is local in character and that will sustain over a relatively short period of time, a well-defined tactical mission. The tactical deception plan is coordinated and approved at the amphibious task force (ATF) or higher level. In addition to the tactical deception plan, the area deception operation may be a deciding factor as to the time, composition of the force, concept of the operation, and method of withdrawal for amphibious raid operations.

1108. PRINCIPLES OF AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS

a. Joint Planning. One of the major principles established and learned in World War II was: the highest command in the OA directs and controlls all amphibious raids. Centralize raiding resources. Pool common experience to benefit training, to standardize equipment, to simplify the administration, collection, and passing of information. All services involved in planning and executing an amphibious raid, analyze its feasibility, assess required forces, select target dates, and provide forces and supporting arms. The raiding force commander must have a clearly defined chain of command. The relationship of the attack group commander (TG) must be identified early with the raiding force commander (task unit or element), especially if the raid commander is junior to the attack force commander. The raid at Dieppe during World War II serves as a good example of the necessity for joint planning, as the following items illustrate:

(1) The target had to be within range of British aircraft bases in England.

(2) The Navy favored attacking the flanks of the town while the Army believing the bridges on the flanks of the town were too weak to support its equipment advocated a frontal attack.

(3) There were too many responsible commanders. The headquarters were situated at considerable distance from one another. The Canadian divisional commander in charge of the raiding force was responsible to General Montgomery for the planning of the land battle; to Admiral Mountbatten, the Chief of Combined Operations; to General Crerar, Commander of all Canadian forces in the U.K. on all matters affecting Canadian national interests; and fourth, to the naval Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, who was responsible for the assault shipping.

b. Training and Rehearsal. The raiding force needs sufficient training and rehearsals to accomplish the assigned task. An 'ad hoc' force quickly formed is often insufficiently prepared. Training must be hard and realistic to produce aggressiveness, determination and individual initiative.

c. Intelligence. Real time current intelligence is the key to a successful raid. You cannot make up for poor intelligence with more firepower. German reports on the Dieppe raid strongly criticized British intelligence. "Allied knowledge of our troop dispositions was extraordinarily inexact." Accurate maps, up-to-date photos, and reliable agents are essential. Knowledge of the local language and use of interpreters are invaluable.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Up-to-date local knowledge, such as curfew restrictions, is vital. National intelligence and psychological warfare efforts can be directed to assist the raid.

d. Simplicity. The plan must be simple and contain minimum written orders. The Germans had valid criticisms of the Dieppe plan: "It was too detailed. It was difficult to visualize as a whole. There was no room for independent action by subordinates." Restrict yourself to a single main objective and be flexible. Allow for unforeseen circumstances. Alternate plans are essential. Your withdrawal must include provisions for alternate routes, embarkation points, and withdrawal times.

e. Economy of Force. Make a quick entry and a quick withdrawal. The approach must be unobserved. Use the smallest possible force consistent with accomplishing the mission. Specialists may be attached to your force. Scientists, press, liaison officers, agents, and technicians will give plausible reasons for going, but are not vital to the aim of the raid. Do not confuse the accomplishment of your mission by increasing the size of the force with unnecessary attachments.

f. Communications. There is a greater need for communication between elements and individuals than on other types, of operations. Each element is critically dependent upon the actions of others. The consequences of an error or some unexpected enemy action on one group can be disastrous if the remainder of the raiding party is not informed. One support group at Dieppe accidently ran into the middle of a German convoy, thus alerting the enemy defenses ashore. This vital fact was never reported to the naval and ground force commanders who were rapidly approaching the beaches with the main force.

g. Fire power. Plan fire support for an amphibious raid similar to that for an amphibious assault. Since surprise is a major factor, withhold supporting fires until surprise is lost. Air and naval gunfire are the principal means of fire support available to the raiding force. Heavy ground fire support by artillery and tanks is normally not available.

h. Surprise. Surprise is critical for a properly executed raid. Plan to accomplish the mission and withdraw the force before the enemy reacts. Surprise offsets, in a large measure, the limited number of personnel, logistics and fire support of the raid force. Surprise requires secrecy during the planning and preparatory phases and includes plans to mislead the enemy about the raid's objectives and timing. Extreme caution is exercised to ensure secrecy of the impending operation.

1109. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Experience during World War II and the Korean War of both U.S. and British forces clearly shows the advantages of controlling and directing all amphibious raids from the highest command in the area of operations. This does not mean that subordinate commands cannot plan and conduct these raids, but area commanders are kept informed and approve such raids to ensure unity of effort and coordination within the area of operations. Such control is necessary to avoid duplication and conflict between units. The principles of organization and of command relationships applicable to all amphibious operations also apply to the amphibious raid. Command relationships for independent and supporting amphibious raids are depicted in figures 1-1 and 1-2. Overall command of the amphibious raid rests with the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF). Due to the unique nature of the assigned missions and the varied composition of troop and naval forces, the common superior specifies in his initiating directive the exact details of command relationships in each case. It is particularly important for the common superior to specify conditions under which basic plans may be changed, the raid delayed or aborted, and similar contingencies.

a. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF). The CATF exercises operational control over a raid attack group and various other task groups through their respective commanders. He may delegate his command authority over a raiding force commander to a subordinate Navy commander such as the operations officer of an advance force with a corresponding raiding force.

b. Attack Group Commander. Regardless of the composition of the attack group, the commander is a Navy officer. He is the common superior of both Navy forces and the raiding force. The relationship between this commander and his related raiding force commander is substantially the same as that between the CATF and the Commander Landing Force (CLF). Disparity in rank or age between these two commanders does not effect consideration of the opinion of the other, particularly in cases involving a decision requiring the exercise of professional judgment in their operational fields. However, since the raiding force is seldom established ashore, there are few cases in which command of the operation is shifted ashore.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

c. Raiding Force Commander. Subject to the overall authority of the attack group commander, the raiding force commander has full responsibility for conducting operations ashore. Since the immediate responsibility for the conduct of the raiding force operation ashore rests with the raiding force commander, the planning and, in most cases, the execution of the landing, assault, and withdrawal are primarily his concern. The feasibility of raiding force proposals is considered for effect on the overall operation. The impracticality of providing necessary support is a valid reason for nonconcurrence in a plan or a proposed course of action of the raiding force.



Fig 1-1. Command relationships for an independent amphibious raid.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



Fig 1-2. Command relationships for an amphibious raid conducted in support.

1110. RAIDING FORCE

Current Marine Corps organization and policy does not provide for any units specifically designated and trained as raiding forces. When the requirement to conduct amphibious raids is imposed upon a LF, the requirement is met by task organizing and training a raiding force from existing LF elements. The nucleus of such a raiding force is normally the infantry element; i.e., platoon, company, or battalion, whichever is appropriate for the assigned mission. The organization of the raiding force varies according to the mission assigned. When raiding operations are conducted over an extensive period of time, a provisional organization is established for overall control, planning, and execution of raid operations. In a specific case, a battalion landing team (BLT), a task organized company, or platoon trained for the task executes a one-time mission.

a. Mission. Decentralization is inherent in this type of operation. The raiding force is given a simple mission which permits a flexible time schedule. Assigning alternate missions is undesirable unless the object is to create a diversion. In this case, contingent missions may be assigned or permission given to engage targets of opportunity.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

b. Size. Raiding force size varies with the assigned mission. ATF and LF planners estimate the smallest number of troops which can do the job. Inferiority in numbers is less important in night raids.

c. Organization. The task-type nature of a raiding force and the tailoring of its component elements to carry out their assigned missions may necessitate departure from normal unit designations; i.e., platoon, company, and battalion. No doctrine exists to resolve this situation. To retain flexibility, the raiding force commander is permitted to task organize the unit in terms of his assigned mission. A raiding force may consist of raiding groups, units, elements, or teams, or a combination of such units.

d. Functional Groupings. The organization of a raiding force is clearly delineated in terms of its functional elements. In this respect, a raiding force may consist of a command and control element, a reconnaissance/security element, an assault element, a covering element, and a reserve element.

(1) Command/Control Element. Consists of the commander, assistant commander, and the administrative and communication facilities required to conduct the raiding operation. The raiding force may have an organic staff. When it is an independent force conducting a one-time operation, it requires a staff to plan and coordinate the operation. When the raiding force is part of a larger force conducting extensive operations on a continuing basis, detailed planning may be developed and coordinated at a higher level and executed without a staff.

(2) Reconnaissance/Security Element. May land before the main body, screens and secures the landing beach or LZ, and provides security observation posts (OP) for these areas during the execution of the raid. In some instances, reconnaissance/security elements execute reconnaissance missions in the OA to select targets for projected raids.

(3) Assault Element. This combat element of the raiding force is responsible for executing the raiding force mission. Normally, it effects its landing after the landing of the reconnaissance/security and covering elements and is the first element to withdraw and reembark.

(4) Covering Element. Lands after the reconnaissance/security element and occupies critical terrain features from which it can cover the advance of the assault element to the target and its subsequent withdrawal. Frequently, covering elements establish blocking positions along main routes of communication to interdict and delay the enemy. In such instances, the covering element may become more actively engaged with the enemy than the assault element.

(5) Reserve. When employed, the reserve of a raiding force is like a reserve in other ground combat operations. If possible, the raiding force is task organized to execute its assigned mission without a reserve. However, when a mission is hazardous or vital, a reserve may be employed and landed with the raiding force. In other cases, a reserve is retained afloat and landed only in case the raiding force needs help in accomplishing the mission or disengaging.

e. Personnel. Most well-trained Marines qualify for raids conducted by regular FMF units. In addition to being well-trained, personnel in the raiding force should possess the following qualifications:

(1) Initiative and adaptability.

(2) Swimming ability.

(3) Stamina.

(4) Scouting ability.

(5) Aptitude for night combat.

(6) Language ability.

f. Equipment. Equipment is checked and tailored for the job. Anything which encumbers the force is taken only if its contribution is necessary to the success of the raid. Items of equipment are not taken simply as a precautionary measure.

(1) When substituting weapons, provisions for adequate training are made for personnel to effectively use the substitute weapons under the stress of combat.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(2) The size or shape of doors and hatches on aircraft or submarines may determine whether a piece of equipment is taken, a new piece of equipment procured, or a substitute item obtained.

1111. INTELLIGENCE

Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is essential to planning and executing an amphibious raid. The strong requirement for secrecy, stealth, speed, and surprise in the amphibious raid generates a need for more precise information than is required for a conventional amphibious assault. Sufficient information on the enemy and the area of operations is required to evaluate the adequacy of the proposed raiding force as organized and equipped, and to predict its relative probability of success or failure. In making a raid, a force has to take calculated risks, but planning a raid based on sketchy or unreliable intelligence increases the probability of failure.

a. Sources and Agencies. Use all intelligence sources and agencies normally used in planning an amphibious operation. At each level of command, planners analyze available information to ensure that it is sufficient. Requests for additional information are initiated as soon as the need is determined. Express the request in precise terms to minimize collection efforts. Collection plans provide for continued gathering of information on the raid OA until the raid is executed. Cross-checking information from two or more sources is fundamental.

b. Intelligence Requirements. Intelligence requirements for the amphibious raid encompass terrain, weather, and hydrography; enemy defenses and patterns of action; and enemy reaction capabilities.

(1) Terrain, Weather, and Hydrography. Intelligence requirements relating to terrain, weather, and hydrography in the target area include the following:

(a) Photographs of landing sites taken at low and high tide showing beach approaches and exits. New aerial photography which might reveal a special interest in the area is ordinarily ruled out. When practical, ground photographs, views from boats, and periscope photography are obtained.

(b) Detailed weather forecasts including cloud coverage for the designated period and the probable effects of weather on the actions of the raiding force and the enemy.

(c) Probable effect of expected wind, surf conditions, terrain, and vegetation on enemy ability to hear movements of the raiding party offshore and on the beach.

(d) Location and relative evaluations of possible landing beaches and zones.

(e) Detailed descriptions of routes of advance to the target area including their relative advantages and disadvantages.

(f) Description of the nature of any possible obstructions or hazards on beach approaches including local currents as effected by the tide, types of bottom (lava, coral or sand), and precautionary measures taken to circumvent them.

(g) Location and description of possible hiding places for boats and men in the area immediately accessible to landing sites and zones.

(h) Detailed description of local surf conditions including any navigational hazards which impede the ship-to-shore movement.

(i) Additional hydrographic charts or other printed information available on the beach approaches.

(j) Requirements for special equipment generated by terrain and weather in the area of operations; e.g., climbing equipment.

(k) Location of any soil or vegetation in the area that could prematurely reveal recent passage of the raiding party; e.g., muddy road surface, and indications of best places to cross coastal roads to avoid detection.

(2) Enemy Situation. Intelligence requirements relating to the enemy situation provides for a detailed analysis of enemy defenses in and around the target area to include the following:

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(a) Strength and arms of enemy forces.

(b) Detailed plans of target installation.

(c) Nature and location of guard posts and routes; composition and frequency of patrols, and use of sentry dogs.

(d) Degree of alertness at night or off duty.

(e) Emplacements, trenches, and fields of fire.

(f) Information on mines and other man-made obstacles.

(g) Communications or other warning systems which the enemy uses.

(h) Type of blackout discipline imposed.

(i) Existence of illuminating devices and intrusion detection devices including mechanical, electronic, magnetic, infrared, seismic, and acoustic.

(j) Details of enemy routine including off-duty routine.

(k) Purpose of all buildings and installations.

(3) Enemy Reaction Capabilities. Intelligence requirements on the enemy's reaction capability demand a realistic estimate of the size and location of forces the enemy has available to reinforce the target area, the speed with which the enemy will react once the raid is discovered, the routes available for this purpose, and the course or courses of action the enemy is most likely to adopt. When enemy drills are observed, a description of enemy tactics and defensive plans are included.

c. Dissemination. The raiding force commander is kept abreast of the intelligence collection effort as it develops. He is also informed of current and imminent friendly operations that affect the execution of the raid. Action to gain information must not compromise security. Every effort is made to help the raiders by making every aspect of the raid familiar to them.

d. Counterintelligence. Detailed counterintelligence planning and active counterintelligence measures are required to support amphibious raids. Strict security, secrecy, and isolation of the raiding force are required during planning, training, rehearsals, and movement to the target area.

1112. PLANNING STAFFS

Parallel planning for the amphibious raid is conducted concurrently by Navy, air, and raiding force staffs.

a. Navy Planning. The CATF establishes overall command and control procedures for the amphibious raid. Naval staff planning establishes procedures for embarkation, movement to the OA, landing, fire support, and withdrawal. Naval planning delineates the craft used for transport and the place and time of embarkation. It also covers the composition and action of the naval escort and gives a rendezvous at sea within striking distance of the coast from which the approach to the landing place commences. Finally, it determines arrangements for signals and communications between ships and shore and establishes recovery procedures for picking up personnel of the raiding force who are stranded ashore after reembarkation is completed.

b. Air Planning. Planning by staffs of air elements supporting the amphibious raid focuses on tactical air operations to protect amphibious shipping, support the scheme of maneuver ashore, and to cover the withdrawal and reembarkation. Specific targets for air attack are delineated in detail. Plans for air attacks are closely timed and coordinated with naval fire support planners to ensure that adequate fire support is available throughout the operation.

(1) During movement to the OA and the landing of the raiding party, sufficient shore or carrier based aircraft should be on call. Maximum air support is needed to cover the withdrawal.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(2) For each amphibious raiding operation, the pros and cons of an air attack before landing the raiding party are carefully considered. A well-timed air attack inflicts casualties and damage and drives the enemy forces underground; it also keeps them on the alert. When the raiding party can get ashore undetected, it is more likely to be successful. Aircraft can make a useful contribution toward surprise by drowning the noise of a landing. When this is used, it is essential that "conditioning" flights are made for several nights beforehand within the same hour and covering a wide frontage of coast. Thus, the enemy becomes used to hearing a regular air patrol and thinks nothing unusual on the night of the raiding operation. Once the raiding party lands, air attacks are directed against the enemy's reaction capability. Using delayed action bombs and other devices adds to the confusion and diversion of enemy efforts to move reinforcements to the target area and assists in covering the withdrawal of the raiding party.

c. Raiding Force Planning. Raiding force planning requires the latest and best information available on actual conditions in the objective and target area. As late intelligence arrives, alternatives and changes are made as necessary and are coordinated with parallel naval and air planning staffs. The staff responsible for raiding force planning develops the same plans required for a normal amphibious operation. In addition, it establishes detailed instructions and procedures for withdrawing the raiding force.

1113. STEPS IN PLANNING

a. The execution of the amphibious raid has three primary areas of concern:

(1) Embarkation, movement to the OA, and the ship-to-shore movement.

(2) Movement to contact and the plan of attack.

(3) Withdrawal and reembarkation.

b. Planning Sequence. While the foregoing actions follow in sequence in executing an amphibious raid, the sequence in which they are planned differs. There are sound reasons for this variation:

(1) The attack on the target is the crux of the raid. All other procedures are designed to facilitate the attack; e.g., the size of the force required to destroy the target establishes the basic requirement for amphibious shipping. Any part of the plan which fails to support the attack is rejected. For this reason, plans for attack on the target are paramount. They are developed first.

(2) Plans for the ship-to-shore movement and for the advance to the target must place the raiding force in the best position for launching the attack.

(3) Withdrawal and subsequent reembarkation must bring the force out of the OA in the most expeditious fashion.

c. Develop Detailed Plans. There are nine major steps in planning the amphibious raid:

(1) Study all available information.

(2) Plan the attack on the target; consider a number of courses of action to accomplish the mission.

(3) Plan movement from LZ or beach to the target.

(4) Plan withdrawal.

(5) Plan ship-to-shore movement.

(6) Plan embarkation and movement to the OA.

(7) Plan the embarkation.

(8) Plan supporting fires.

(9) Prepare the task organization and equipment list.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

d. Study All Available Information. Planners initially analyze current information on the enemy situation, the OA (terrain, weather, hydrography, local communication systems), and the attitude of civilian inhabitants. Recent, concurrent, and imminent operations by other friendly forces are considered in detail.

(1) Attempt to determine the following:

(a) Organization, equipment, composition, and disposition of enemy forces in the OA.

(b) Enemy reaction capability including the following:

- Type, size and location of reaction force.

- Reaction time.

- Avenues of approach.

- Probable courses of action.

(2) Determine intelligence requirements (IR)

(a) Study information available on the enemy and area of operations to identify gaps in knowledge and raise additional questions.

(b) Express gaps and questions as essential elements of information (EEI) or other intelligence requirements(OIR).

(3) Study area of operations. This is critical to such items as alternate routes and escape and evasion (E+E) plans.

e. Plan Attack of the Target. The raid mission establishes the scope of action during the attack on the target; e.g., whether total or partial destruction is to be accomplished, removal of specified equipment, capture of prisoners, etc. The raiding force is organized into task elements to achieve maximum flexibility and to reduce troop requirements to the minimum number essential. Each group is tailored to accomplish a specific task in support of the plan of attack. At a minimum, forces are organized to eliminate enemy security, attack the target, and to cover the withdrawal. Plans for attacking the target are simple, easy to execute, and within the capabilities of the raiding force. Consider the method of entry, the use of objective rallying points (ORP) and casualty evacuation procedures.

f. Movement from Beach or Landing Zone to Objective. Make plans to ensure that the assault element reaches the target intact. To accomplish this, employ one or more covering elements to neutralize and contain any enemy opposition that attempts to interfere with the assault element. The composition of each covering element depends on the assigned task and the resistance it is expected to encounter.

g. Withdrawal. As soon the mission is accomplished, the withdrawal begins. It is part of the final step in the scheme of maneuver and is carefully planned. At this stage in the operation, the offensive spirit of the raiding troops tends to decline, while capture of the target has alerted the enemy, who should react vigorously. For these reasons, the commander ensures that the withdrawal is executed rapidly and systematically. Raid elements withdraw along predesignated routes and in a specified sequence. Plans include provisions for certain elements to cover the withdrawal and to conduct delaying actions if the enemy pursues. Maximum use is made of available naval gunfire and air support to cover the withdrawal and reembarkation. Like other phases of the raid, plans for the withdrawal include alternate times, routes, and sequence of movement to reembarkation points and/or LZ's.

h. Ship-to-Shore Movement. Planning for the ship-to-shore movement is similar to that for an amphibious assault. Due to the simplicity of plans, the smaller scale of the raid, and the proficiency gained during rehearsals; control ships and lines of departure are seldom used. The ship-to-shore movement is rehearsed in detail under conditions similar to those in the OA to ensure proper timing and coordination.

i. Embarkation and Movement to the Objective Area. Plan embarkation and movement to the OA according to standard amphibious procedures. To maintain the element of surprise, emphasize speed and movement during periods of reduced visibility. Plan appropriate antiair and antisubmarine warfare measures to protect the attack group during this phase of the operation.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(1) Navy emphasizes the following:

(a) Counterintelligence activity.

(b) OPSEC.

(c) Movement of forces by covered vehicle from several routes only at night.

(d) Staging forces in several ships and moving to one ship at night.

(2) Establish "notional" Marine Amphibious Units (MAU's) by message traffic.

j. Reembarkation. A reembarkation point or points are selected during planning of the scheme of maneuver. While a raiding force may reembark at the same point it landed, circumstances sometimes require that reembarkation be made at a different beach or LZ. Withdrawing from the OA by air may be possible when enemy resistance is light or has been eliminated. Withdrawal by air may be necessary when enemy air or naval action forces amphibious shipping to withdraw from the area. Make alternate reembarkation points or pickup zones and provisions for shifting to these in emergencies. The original reembarkation point is not changed unless it is essential to do so. Make plans for recovery of persons unable to reembark with the main body of the raiding force. Ensure personnel accountability and the proper marking of pick-up areas.

k. Supporting Fires. The principles of naval gunfire and close air support during amphibious operations apply to the amphibious raid. Fire support plans are coordinated with the landing plan, scheme of maneuver, and plan for reembarkation. Surprise is a major factor; supporting fires are usually withheld until surprise is lost.

l. Task Organization and Equipment List. After the raiding force, air, and naval planning staffs have developed detailed plans concurrently, requirements for troop units, specialists, and support are accurately determined. The raiding force is organized into specific task groups commensurate with the number and nature of subordinate units involved. Unit structure adheres to tables of organization (T/O) as much as possible. However, some deviations are inevitable due to the necessity for tailoring task groups to the specific tasks. Based on the raiding force organization, prepare lists of specific equipment, weapons, ammunition, and supplies which each subordinate group will carry.

1114. SCHEME OF MANEUVER

a. Assemble all intelligence on the area and the enemy. Determine the size and type of raiding force concurrently with plans for attacking the objective. In developing the scheme of maneuver, selecting the landing beaches or LZ is of particular importance. The selected beaches or zones should permit easy access to the objective; however, if surprise is of paramount importance, a less suitable beach or LZ, or one more distant from the objective, is chosen.

b. Since decentralization is inherent in this type of operation, the raiding force is given a simple mission which permits a flexible time schedule. Assigning alternate missions is undesirable unless the object is to create a diversion. In this case, contingent missions are assigned or permission given to engage targets of opportunity. Ensure that failure to accomplish one task does not cause the entire operation to fail.

c. Withdrawal is the final step in the scheme of maneuver. Factors considered in planning the withdrawal are: the time required to attack and to reduce the objective, the expected enemy reaction, the delay resulting from enemy reaction and friendly casualties, and availability of a covering force. A covering force element is designated to prevent enemy action from interfering with the main body's attack on the objective and the withdrawal. Reembarkation points are selected as part of the scheme of maneuver. Once the operation begins, do not change this point unless absolutely necessary, since change at any time during the raid is confusing and may result in disaster. While a raiding force may reembark at the points at which it lands, circumstances can dictate that a different point or beach be designated. When the raiding force lands on a small island or narrow peninsula, consider reembarking on the opposite side. In addition, landings or withdrawals by water may be combined with air entry or evacuation.

1115. TRANSPORTATION

The raiding force is transported into and out of the OA by surface or subsurface shipping, transport aircraft, or by a combination of these means. Helicopter, landing craft, inflatable boats, and parachute can land the force.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

a. For a large-scale raid, use conventional transports which approach at relatively high speeds and load and unload rapidly.

b. For raids by small units, use transport aircraft, the high speed transport ship, or the transport submarine.

c. Once within the range of the target, raiders are landed by a number of means including:

(1) Helicopters.

(2) Landing craft.

(3) Inflatable boats.

(4) Swimmer delivery vehicles.

(5) Parachute.

1116. CHOICE OF LANDING PLACE

a. Beach Selection. In selecting a landing place, examine all possible beaches to find a beach which allows for a surprise approach from the sea and a landing in calm water. The latter is desirable although it increases the difficulty of effecting surprise. Sheltered waters are usually enclosed in a bay or in the lee of islands so that ships run a risk of being spotted as they approach and are intercepted as soon as they return. Such bays may also be protected by minefields. Avoid landing places which you cannot approach from several different directions. Other factors considered in beach selection include the following:

(1) Conformance with the scheme of maneuver.

(2) Probability of gaining surprise.

(3) Enemy dispositions.

(4) Distance to target.

(5) Sea approaches, beach characteristics, and beach exists.

(6) Equipment moved over the beach.

(7) Availability of cover and concealment.

b. Raiding Force Orientation. A major consideration in beach selection is determining an initial point for raiding force orientation ashore. The location of this point must be known precisely, with respect to the beach/zone and to the objective. The point such as a river mouth or bridge across a river must be easy to recognize. The beach/zone must be offset from the initial point to such an extent that if the raiding force lands anywhere near the beach/zone, it will be able to move in a predetermined direction and to locate the initial point. (See fig 1-3). The landing beach zone should be large enough to allow for minor errors in predicted drift of parachutists, swimmers, or boat teams.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



Fig 1-3. Selection of initial points.

c. Landing Beaches. Selecting a coastal landing beach usually involves a compromise. The choice is between a beach which permits easy landing with some risk of detection, and one which provides maximum security at the risk of a difficult or hazardous landing. Examples of each are a wide, flat, sandy beach backed by an easily traversed hinterland and a narrow, steep, rocky beach backed by cliffs.

(1) Consider surf state. Consult the hydrographic offices for current information.

(2) Preferred surf conditions exist when ocean waves break in a single breaker line about 200 feet from the beach and the intervening space contains several foam lines which dissipate the force of the surf. The least desirable surf conditions exist when several breaker lines are present or when a single breaker line spills directly onto the beach. The depth of a breaking wave on an evenly sloping beach is approximately 3 times the height of the wave. When a bar is present, it may cause the waves to break in water up to 1.7 times the height of the wave.

(3) The characteristics of the surf on a given day are based upon the nature of the bottom, the direction and speed of the wind, the distance between successive swells (wave length), the state of the tide, and the nature of the currents. Some factors to consider when predicting relative surf characteristics are the following:

(a) Offshore shoals, ledges, and rough bottom contours reduce the surf.

(b) Offshore islands break up ocean swells and produce several patterns of smaller waves.

(c) Kelp or any variety of dense seaweed reduce wave height.

(d) Swift currents flowing in the direction of wave advance and onshore winds reduce wave height.

(e) A reef face or other abrupt break in the bottom may cause each wave to break up into smaller waves.

(f) A submarine ridge perpendicular to the coast increases wave height; conversely, a submarine canyon reduces wave height. The use of a submarine canyon or trough close to the beach may reduce or eliminate wading through shallow water and surf. Look for indications of such troughs when landing in landing craft or small boats.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(g) A steep bottom causes waves to break rapidly and close to or on the beach, accompanied by violent wave uprush.

(h) A flat bottom causes waves to break gradually and at a greater distance from the beach with several foam lines formed between the breaker line and the beach.

(i) A sand bar parallel to the beach causes waves to peak up or break depending upon the depth of water over the bar. A single breaker line may form over a bar while another breaker line forms closer to or on the beach. The presence of several bars may cause multiple breaker lines. Sandbars are frequently found off sandy beaches exposed to wave action.

d. Inland Landing Zones. The choice of an inland LZ is also based on a compromise between ease of landing and security. The major factor in selecting the LZ is the presence of obstacles that restrict helicopter operations. LZ's should accommodate major elements of the raid group at a single touchdown. They should be close to the target, offer several good routes to and from the target, and facilitate the organization of a perimeter defense by reconnaissance/security elements of the raiding force.

1117. SELECTING DATES (TIDE FACTORS)

In a waterborne ship-to-shore movement, the first combination of suitable moon and tide fixes the date of the operation to three consecutive days. The first of these three days is selected to leave two alternate days in case of bad weather.

a. Moon. The moon should rise on the landward side after the raiding party is ashore. This allows the ships and boats to approach in complete darkness with landmarks faintly silhouetted against the glow preceding the rising moon. Later, the raiders advance into an increasing glow of moonlight to show the way and make a silhouette of an approaching enemy. Ideally, the moon is still low enough for withdrawal in comparative darkness.

b. Tide. Favorable tide conditions are a matter of choice and vary with different types of coast. It is better to land with a rising tide. The reembarkation also needs a rising tide. All other factors being constant, the Navy prefers to land on a rising tide to reduce the stranding of landing craft above the water level. The raiding force commander should consider a landing at low tide. The defensive arrangements at night; e.g., fixed lines of machineguns, etc., are designed to catch landing parties somewhere near the high watermark. Accordingly, if the landing is made at low tide, there is a fair chance of gaining surprise. In such a landing, there may even be space to deploy before the advance and to maneuver in order to flank enemy machinegun positions in the landing area. The farther out the tide, the less chance of the landing being seen or heard by shore posts. The chief disadvantage of a landing at low tide is loss of time. It may add as much as a mile of distance to the beach, and the raiding party may have to wade from the boats and back.

1118. TIMING THE OPERATION

Timing depends on whether the whole raid is completed during one night or the troops remain and are taken off during a following night. In a thickly garrisoned country with good communications, take the raiding party off the same night. In such cases, ships are outside the range of enemy artillery by daylight. Normally, the LF assault and withdrawal are completed under cover of darkness. This does not allow the raiding party much time to accomplish its assigned mission. On a short summer night, as few as three hours may be left after allowing for disembarkation and reembarkation. It is unsafe to allow less than an hour for each mile covered ashore. The time schedule should allow for unforeseen delay. Check and verify all times in rehearsals, approximating actual conditions expected during a raid.

1119. FIRE SUPPORT

Fire support planning for an amphibious raid is similar to that for an amphibious assault. Since surprise is a major factor, supporting fires are usually withheld until surprise is lost.

a. Fire Support Means. Air and naval gunfire are the principal means of fire support available to the raiding force. Heavy ground fire support means; i.e., artillery and tanks are normally not landed as part of, or in support of, a raid force.

b. Employment

(1) Ship-to-Shore Movement. Normally, the raid force landing is accomplished by stealth. Supporting fires will be planned, but are not employed at this phase unless unforeseen circumstances necessitate aborting the mission.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(2) Attacks on the Objective. Use air and naval gunfire for preparatory fire. During and after the attack, it may be shifted to targets which constitute the greatest threat to mission accomplishment (e.g., assembly areas, roads, bridges which could be used by reinforcing enemy troops, enemy artillery, or rocket positions which could place fire on friendly positions).

(3) Withdrawal. Air and naval gunfire support may be required to cover the withdrawal of the raiding force to its reembarkation area, and the subsequent withdrawal of the entire raiding force. Such fires are designed to screen the elements of the raiding force and to preclude interception by the enemy as the raiding force disengages and effects its withdrawal.

c. Fire Support Coordination. A series of no-fire lines proceeding back from the target area to the beach or LZ's may be established. Withdrawing elements of the raid force inform the raid commander as they clear successive lines. The raid commander approves all fires covering the withdrawal. When feasible, the raid element requesting them observes and controls them.

d. Fire Plans. Detailed fire support plans are prepared to cover all phases of the operation and foreseeable emergency contingencies; i.e., aborting of the mission at an early stage.

1120. SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

Planning for the ship-to-shore movement is similar to that for an amphibious assault. This is especially true in large waterborne or heliborne raids. However, in all cases, the general unloading period of the ship-to-shore phase is deleted. The usual control ships and lines of departure off landing beaches are normally used only for large-scale raids.

a. The method selected for the ship-to-shore movement lands the raiding force with the least probability of detection. It lands the raiding force on or as close to its objective as possible and as simply and rapidly as possible.

b. Night landings or landings under reduced visibility are common. The raiding force emphasizes techniques which preserve surprise; communication restrictions, late deployment of landing craft, and alternate plans for changing landing beaches in the event of compromise. Consider the possibility of landing either a pre-H-hour landing party or the first troop waves in rubber boats to seize initial objectives and cover the remainder of troops landing in conventional types of craft.

1121. WITHDRAWAL AND REEMBARKATION

a. Withdrawal commences immediately after the mission is accomplished. It is the final step in the scheme of maneuver of a raid. Since the spirit of the offensive declines, at this time enemy reaction may be more violent than during earlier phases of the raid. Consequently, the greatest threat to the survival of the raid force exists at this time. The withdrawal phase must be well planned, rehearsed, and coordinated. The various task elements withdraw along predesignated routes and in a specified sequence. This sequence provides for task elements to cover the withdrawal and to conduct delaying actions if the enemy pursues.

b. Factors considered in planning the withdrawal are: time required to attack and accomplish the mission, anticipated delay because of expected and unexpected enemy reaction, and foreseeable casualty load. While a raiding force usually withdraws to the same point at which it landed, circumstances may dictate that a different LZ or beach be designated. In addition, landings or withdrawals by water may be combined with air entry or reembarkation. Therefore, selecting the withdrawal point is an important consideration during planning of the scheme of maneuver. Once the operation begins, this point is not changed unless absolutely necessary. A change at any time during the raid is confusing and may be disastrous. Select routes of withdrawal which facilitate movement and are easily identified. They should be behind terrain that affords protection to personnel withdrawing and offer positions from which covering elements can block enemy counteractions.

c. The withdrawal plan must be flexible. Include alternatives for time and place of embarkation. If the landing beach/zone and withdrawal beach/zone are not the same, establish a positive means of location and identification. If you think you may use nuclear demolitions, make plans to avoid the hazards of residual radiation. Special situations may permit planning for the withdrawal of the raiding force directly into territory of either friendly regular, or guerrilla forces. Consider withdrawal by air when facilities and aircraft are available and withdrawal by ship is more dangerous.

d. Evaluate surf characteristics during the withdrawal in the same manner as for the landing. Consider the state of the tide and its effect on the surf when selecting an exact time for withdrawal.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

e. Alternate plans for withdrawal include providing for routes and a sequence of movement during the withdrawal, alternate methods of shore-to-ship movement, or air withdrawal vice coastal withdrawal. Select alternate times in the same manner as primary times, usually at approximately 24-hour intervals.

f. Withdrawal and reembarkation proceed concurrently until all personnel and equipment are reembarked. The psychological impact on the enemy is much greater if the raiding force disappears without a trace. Destroy all equipment that cannot be withdrawn.

1122. LOGISTICS

Logistic planning for the amphibious raid involves providing the minimum essential supplies required to accomplish the assigned mission. Detailed planning and coordination are required because of the short duration and the "one-shot" nature of the operation. The raid force has little, if any, opportunity to correct or compensate for mistakes made in logistic plans.

a. Supply. Supplies which the raiding force carries are restricted to the prescribed load established in planning and tested in actual rehearsals. The load of raid force elements is lightened to the minimum considered consistent with executing the assigned mission.

b. Resupply. Usually there is no resupply of a raiding force. However, an air-drop of class I and class V items may be necessary if the enemy succeeds in prolonging the withdrawal of the raiding force. In rare cases, it may be possible to preposition supplies or equipment by clandestine means before the actual raid.

c. Critical Items. All equipment taken on the raid is evaluated in terms of its contribution to the overall raid mission. Items critical to executing the mission are identified during planning. Such items are given detailed maintenance checks to ensure good working order. When feasible, land or carry additional quantities of critical equipment in amphibious shipping as "insurance items."

d. Maintenance/Modification. All equipment that the raiding force uses is inspected frequently and tested under simulated raid conditions during rehearsals. Standard equipment is modified as necessary to cope with the special conditions of the raid. Special equipment is improvised or manufactured to meet special requirements generated by the nature of the raid. It is extremely important that the raid force have the exact types of equipment required to carry out its combat tasks ashore.

e. Vehicles. Lightweight, air transportable vehicles enhance the mobility of a raiding force and permit it to move rapidly into position, execute its attack on foot, and withdraw from the objective. However, the nature of most amphibious raids limits the requirement for ground transportation. As a raid force increases in size, its supply requirements increase and ground transportation support becomes an important consideration.

f. Combat Service Support (CSS). Logistic plans provide for furnishing appropriate CSS personnel to the raid force. Such support consists of engineers, principally demolitionists, shore party personnel, and helicopter support teams. Make such assignments early in planning so that personnel can participate in the full training and rehearsal cycle.

g. Medical. Medical support covers immediate treatment and evacuation. The medical officer aboard ship exercises technical medical supervision over the entire raid force to cope with foreseeable casualties ashore. If feasible, evacuate casualties early by the fastest available means. If helicopters are not available throughout the raid, and AAV's are used, set up a mobile aid station in one of these, particularly in chilly weather.

1123. TRAINING

Landing force, naval, and air elements detailed for the amphibious raiding operation meet for combined training as early as possible. It is important to have the same boats, helicopters, and crews for both the training and the actual operation and to keep the same serial assignments throughout. One of the main objectives of the training period is to rehearse the raid under conditions approximating, as nearly as possible, those which the raiding force will meet during the operation. Night raids require more training. Special training under as many different conditions as possible prepares the raiding force to meet varied conditions at the raid area. Rehearse the landing on a strip of coast like the one chosen for the attack. The chief aim of this preparation is to develop a highly trained force familiar with the ground over which they will operate.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

a. Unit Training. Major emphasis is placed on unit training. Unit training as discussed here means the training of the task organization assigned to the mission. Normally, units and individuals complete appropriate amphibious training before assignment to a raiding force. In general, units and commanders are selected for their experience as a coordinated team, their morale, and their previous combat experience.

(1) Integrated training with specialists, naval units, and supporting forces commences as early as possible. As a guide, 30 days of training are normally required to adjust the raiding force to special climatic conditions of an OA when it differs materially from the one in which they normally operate.

(2) During the training cycle while the individual is improving his skills, the unit trains specifically for its mission. The maxim that "practice makes perfect" is especially applicable to training for raiding. Individuals, task groups, and the raiding force are drilled until every aspect of the raid plan becomes an automatic process. Troops are uniformed and equipped in the exact fashion required for the raid. Opposing troops are employed to accustom the force to operate, as they must during the raid and to test their proficiency. Training frequently extends to periods where the raiding troops are subjected to extreme physical and mental strain.

b. Individual Training. Individuals selected should be experienced infantrymen, schooled in basic subjects, and possessing the special skills required for the accomplishing the mission and/or the specific tasks. Before assignment, personnel are screened for physical, medical, and mental defects which would hinder their performance. Individuals undergo a rigid physical hardening process to enable them to accomplish missions calling for the utmost in physical stamina and to weed out those individuals who are physically and psychologically unqualified. Normally, the raiding force begins training slightly overstrength. Individuals separated from the raiding force during training as well as administrative support personnel are kept in isolation until completion of the mission.

(1) Separation of individual training and unit training is minimized. Individual skills are improved while undergoing unit training. Refresher training in basic subjects, especially applicable to the raid, is often necessary. This may include amphibious training; swimming; heliborne operations; hand-to-hand combat; and escape, evasion, and survival training.

(2) Subjects in which special training is most often necessary include night operations, passage of obstacles, physical training that develops stamina; use of communication means to be employed during the raid, and collection of intelligence data. Each individual must be thoroughly familiar with his own role in the operation and how it relates to the overall plan. Experience has also proven the importance of having every Marine oriented on the complete plan of operation. Training of individuals in the raiding force should ensure the following:

(a) Basic amphibious training.

(b) Refresher training in basic subjects especially applicable to the raiding plan.

(c) Special training in rubber boat handling, demolitions, use of enemy weapons and equipment, cliff-scaling techniques, and operation of special equipment and arms.

c. Recognition Training. Recognition in the dark is very difficult, particularly when the time comes for reembarkation. By this time, the withdrawing raiding party may be mixed up with hostile patrols, and enemy craft may even get in among the raiding party's boats. A password is some help, but no real solution, as men have to get very close to recognize the password above the noise of the waves. Flashing of lights is far too dangerous except by a few selected leaders; unauthorized flashlights are not permitted. The best means of recognition is some very distinctive headgear or an agreed arm signal. Another system is to issue the men a pair of luminescent discs to be tied on the belt in front and behind. These discs are made either square, round, or triangular so that the recognition mark can be changed for each operation. If practical, using night observation electronic and optical devices should be considered in passive and active modes. Recognition systems and techniques should be integrated into all training and rehearsals as soon as practicable to ensure that all raiding force members are completely familiar with their use before the projected operation.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1124. REHEARSALS

Rehearsals assume even greater importance in preparing for amphibious raids than for other types of amphibious operations. Thorough, integrated rehearsals are required to obtain precision and speed in the execution of a raid. All participating forces are drilled in every detail of debarkation, movement ashore, operations ashore, withdrawal, and reembarkation. Timing, so vitally important in the amphibious raid, cannot be accurately estimated or adhered to without adequate rehearsals of the entire raiding force. The purpose and conduct of rehearsals for amphibious raids are similar to those for the amphibious assault. Rehearsals are conducted to verify time and space factors for each phase of the raid; to ensure proper timing; to familiarize personnel with the operation plan and special equipment and techniques to be employed; to measure proficiency of the individuals, elements, unit, and the group; to develop coordination, resolve problems, and suggest necessary changes; and to incorporate all previous modifications to the plan.

a. Rehearsal Requirements. Charts, maps, and aerial photographs; a large-scale sand table model; and a scheduled rehearsal area, flat or hilly depending on the target area, are required for rehearsals. Construct a full-scale replica of the target area with roads and tracks taped out, and buildings represented. Rehearse troops in the dark, and carefully time the movements from point to point. The success or failure of the whole operation depends upon rehearsing before the operation. Every conceivable effort to achieve realism enhances success. Rehearsals generate requirements for special equipment such as scaling apparatus and special demolition kits. Make full-scale models for troops to practice on.

b. Testing of Plans. During rehearsals, evaluate and check the plan for the amphibious raid to ensure success. The concept of operation, task organization, and scheme of maneuver are examined in turn:

(1) Concept of Operation. Test the concept of operation in terms of the following criteria:

(a) Is the plan, as presented, realistic under conditions portrayed?

(b) Is the plan sufficiently bold in concept?

(c) Have all available resources been exploited?

(d) Have existing policy restrictions been considered?

(e) Is the principle of surprise properly exploited?

(f) Are the reasons for selecting H-hour valid?

(g) Has the problem of withdrawal been considered objectively?

(h) Have plans been adequately tested and rehearsed?

(2) Task Organization. The task organization is tested in terms of the following criteria:

(a) Is the raiding force of proper size?

(b) Have existing T/O organizations been used where feasible?

(c) Has adequate consideration been given to eliminating personnel unnecessary to the mission?

(d) Is an adequate reserve provided for?

(3) Scheme of Maneuver. The scheme of maneuver is tested in terms of the following criteria:

(a) Are logical objectives or tasks assigned to subordinate elements?

(b) Do all assigned objectives contribute to the basic mission?

(c) Has enemy reaction been realistically considered?

(d) Do landing areas put troops on the beach/landing zone in the best place to accomplish the various missions or tasks to be performed?

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(e) Have all phases of the operation been considered?

(f) Is the time available adequate to land, attack the target, withdraw, and not subject the raiding force to unnecessary risks?

1125. SECURITY

Once training starts, the maintaining secrecy is a difficult problem. It is impossible to conceal the fact that a landing operation is being planned. Concentrate efforts only on keeping secret the size, date, and place. There is no need for anyone to know the date until the time comes to move to the embarkation point. Secrecy about the destination conflicts with the vital necessity of familiarizing the troops with the ground over which to operate. The best way of ensuring secrecy is to keep participating elements in isolation during the rehearsal period with no contact at all with the outside world. This is not always possible, and the problem of concealing the departure of personnel from the area remains. A good deal of ingenuity is needed to accomplish a secret departure. Phasing troops and equipment to embarkation areas in darkness assists in alleviating this problem.

1126. NIGHT LANDING TECHNIQUES

The execution of a night landing as part of an amphibious raid does not require any departure from basic amphibious doctrines, nor does it require any substantial variation in LF techniques. However, certain essential considerations require added emphasis.

a. Selection of Objectives, Landing Zones, and Landing Beaches. Planning for a night landing by the raiding party requires simple and effective control measures for the conduct of the ship-to-shore movement, landing, and movement to the raid objective. The landing points should be easily identifiable under all conditions of visibility. The distance to the raid objective from the LZ's or beaches should be reasonably short. Terrain features in the area should allow the raiding party to move easily to its assigned objective.

(1) Routes of egress from LZ's and/or beaches should be readily accessible and approaches to the raid objective well defined and easy to negotiate.

(2) Landing beaches are selected so as to be readily identifiable from seaward. They may be narrower than for a daylight landing since individual boat waves consist of a minimum number of craft to ensure effective control.

b. Navigation and Control. Landing the raiding party at the precise time and place is especially important as it is the basic reference point for the planned raiding operation ashore. The employment of helicopters for the ship-to-shore movement in a night operation is often predicated on the capability of helicopters to set down in a specific, relatively small, undeveloped site or zone. Helicopter and surface ship-to-shore movement plans need to be simple and should involve a minimum number of directional changes.

c. Training and Rehearsal. The detailed coordination required in an amphibious raid conducted at night requires a number of carefully supervised rehearsals for all participating elements, both for naval forces and the raiding party. Using helicopters requires particular effort to familiarize pilots with the nature of the terrain to be traversed, with the use of navigational aids, and with the details of the tactical plan.

d. Night Landing Techniques. The following techniques help to overcome some difficulties of the helicopter and surface ship-to-shore movements in a night amphibious raid:

(1) Surface Landing

(a) Use lucite wands, luminous tape, and luminous marking paint to facilitate movement.

(b) Every available means should be exploited to reduce the possibility of boats and amphibious vehicles becoming lost (e.g., they should not be required to serve shipping which is further away than vessels adjacent in formation).

(c) Transfer of personnel between ships during darkness is held to a minimum.

(d) Use LF reconnaissance units or underwater demolition units to plant radar, radio, or infrared buoys and beacons, or distinctive shielded lights on or off the landing beach. Lights or beacons should be of specified height, intensity, color, and if flashing have a specified code. Avoid using steady white lights to avoid confusion with lights ashore.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(e) Give all personnel thorough training in the details of the ship-to-shore movement under conditions of reduced visibility with emphasis placed on the part individual members of the raiding party are to play.

(f) Use screened blinker lights, electronic equipment, infrared equipment, voice radio, or loudspeakers to dispatch and control of waves. The method prescribed depends upon security requirements at the objective and conditions of visibility.

(g) If the colored light system is used for dispatching waves, it may be paralleled by infrared equipment, voice radio, and loudspeaker systems.

(h) Guide ships having the necessary radar equipment may be used to lead the boat groups from the rendezvous areas to the line of departure.

(i) Equip each wave guide boat with a radar reflector or radar beacon to permit accurate tracing by control ships.

(j) Control boats and ships should be equipped with sufficient infrared equipment to permit control activities to proceed simultaneously with intership signalling.

(k) Establish approach control points at intervals in the boat lanes.

(l) The LCD should be established as close to the beach as possible in light of hydrographic and tactical considerations.

(m) If other conditions permit, the course from the ship marking the approach lane to the LCD should be the same as that for the LCD to the beach.

(n) Coxswains and amphibious vehicle operators should be furnished with a chart showing locations of, and magnetic courses to, the control vessels and transports. Before the operation, make sure to equip amphibious vehicles with compasses. If none are so equipped, wave guide boats must be used until close inshore. Landing formation will be either a column or wedge.

(o) If the state of individual and unit training permits, consider a high speed, underway launch of amphibious vehicles.

(2) Helibourne Landing

(a) Move the raiding party to designated LZ's in a single lift.

(b) Reduce control and navigation problems by selecting landmarks which are easily recognizable at night.

(c) Consider using parachute or helicopter-landed pathfinders equipped with both radar and visual homing and landing devices.

(d) Approach and retirement lanes should be well separated and should involve as few directional changes as possible.

(e) In the LZ's, identify routes and areas with fluorescent tape or markers.

1127. SUMMARY OF AMPHIBIOUS RAID TECHNIQUES

To expedite the preparation of plans within the amphibious raiding force, the commander designated in the initiating directive assembles his staff in a central locality for coordinated planning. One of their first considerations is the acquisition and processing of available information, and the initiation of requests and directives for the collection of further information to support the raid. Concurrently, security and counterintelligence plans are established to prevent disclosing any operations to the enemy. The raiding force commander's concept of operations ashore is the crux of the operation. Its development precedes detailed planning for surface and air support elements.

a. Preparation of Plans. Once the plan has tentative approval, preliminary organization of the raiding force, the selection of required personnel, and a tentative training program based on the concept of operations are formulated. Similarity to the OA and isolation of the raid force are principal considerations in selectioning the training and rehearsal sites. Constant examination by the commander and staff of all training and rehearsals provides a basis for evaluation and modification of plans. During this period, logistic requirements are determined and equipment procured to support the specific mission of the raid. In addition,

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

equipment and supplies are packaged to be compatible with hatches and doors of the transporting aircraft or shipping and to meet any other specific requirements. The raiding force trains with the prescribed loads to test the feasibility of all equipment.

b. Embarkation. Normally, the raiding force trains with the aircraft and/or ships which will be employed in the actual raid. However, if the raiding force trains in a rear area and moves into a forward area to pick up their transportation, liaison and final rehearsals are conducted with the actual vessels to be employed. Before final embarkation, all personnel and equipment are checked against embarkation lists. Nuclear and nonnuclear demolitions sets require separate stowage considerations. Other special stowage is arranged when required.

c. Movement to the Objective. Final movement to the OA normally is effected by stealth and deception. To avoid deterioration of proficiency attained in training, conduct frequent drills and rehearsals. The training depends on the available time and type of transportation. In addition, ensure daily inspections of equipment for serviceability. If possible, supplies are prepositioned for debarkation. Final and detailed briefings are held for all personnel. These briefings include the latest intelligence on the OA.

d. Ship-to-Shore Movement. Once in the OA, take strict precautions to avoid detection by visual, sonic, and electromagnetic detection devices employed by the enemy. Debarkation is conducted following established procedures practiced during training. Troops train for night vision below deck as debarkation may easily take twice as long when they are not accustomed to the dark. During debarkation, take special precautions for loading weapons and handling explosives. Just before going to debarkation stations, the transporting vessel issues to the raiding force the final heading from the ship to the landing beach, weather forecast, water temperature, estimate of set and drift of currents, wind conditions, and surf forecast.

(1) Once embarked in landing craft, conduct a final check of equipment.

(2) Ship-to-shore navigation is conducted by dead reckoning. The course is maintained by observation of celestial bodies, reference to shoreline silhouette, or prearranged signals from shore. The course is set to compensate for set and drift of current and wind conditions. When available, radar can be of considerable assistance.

(3) Reconnaissance/security and covering elements are the first to land, followed quickly by the main body. Prolonged station-keeping operations offshore are difficult and increase the possibility of detection. Beaching follows in rapid succession. Landing craft are either cached ashore or returned to the ship. Hide parachute and SCUBA equipment if they are employed for entry. If boats are cached ashore, the raiding force must return to the same beach.

e. Approach to the Raid Objective. Once the raiding force is ashore and has located its initial point near the landing beach, the various elements deploy to carry out their missions. While the covering element(s) provides security for the assault elements' movement to the objective, the assault element does not delay or wait for security. Enemy discovery of a covering element may alert the objective and thus successfully block the assault element from carrying out its mission.

f. Assault of the Raid Objective. The attack on the objective is normally sudden and violent; however, it may be accomplished by stealth (e.g., the objective is destroyed by delayed atomic or conventional demolitions after the raiding force has withdrawn). In most cases, missions requiring the destruction of an objective are easier than missions requiring the evacuation of prisoners or friendly personnel. When the force is assigned a destruction mission, a decision is made as to whether the whole objective is to be destroyed or just the components or personnel which are essential to its functioning. In many instances, the mission of the raid is the selective destruction of vital components of equipment or the killing of key enemy personnel. When supporting arms are employed, they normally commence with the assault of the objective and continue through the final withdrawal.

g. Retirement to the Beach. The retirement to the beach is influenced by the time it takes to attack and assault the objective, enemy reaction, time needed to care for and evacuate casualties, and the mode of transportation used. In any case, it must be swift and orderly. Again, the covering element assists the assault element. Make every effort to leave no evidence of the raiding force for enemy intelligence. However, destroy equipment which cannot be reembarked. Destruction techniques for all types of equipment employed by the raiding party should be part of individual and unit training. Helicopters evacuate casualties.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

h. Reembarkation. Once the raiding force arrives at the beach or LZ, the means for evacuation seaward must be available for immediate loading. This is a critical coordination point in the withdrawal of the raiding force. In addition, the possibility of being discovered during the shore-to-ship movement is greater than during the ship-to-shore movement because the enemy is alerted and looking for the raiding force. Therefore, greater cover and protection are provided to prevent enemy interference with this overwater movement. Upon arrival alongside the transporting vessel, the raiding force, assisted by naval personnel, carries out procedures for reembarkation. In most cases, the ship is in an underway status before completing reembarkation. Once the report is made that the reembarkation is complete, the vessel leaves the OA. When helicopters and aircraft are employed, the transport ship may proceed from the OA as reembarkation takes place.

i. Recovery of Personnel. A combination of recovery methods is usually better than relying on any single method. In the event all personnel are not initially recovered, alternate pickup locations, methods, and times are predesignated in the raid plan. Normally, recovery is attempted at 24-hour intervals for as many days as are practical without endangering the whole force. Personnel are briefed as to evasion, escape, and survival procedures beforehand and may have to depend on these skills to return to friendly areas.

(1) Immediately upon recovery, an intelligence officer or members of the planning staff interrogate and debrief personnel of the raiding force, who are then briefed on what information may be released about the overall operation.

(2) After a suitable recovery period, the raiding force may be assigned a further raiding mission or it may enter into a retraining cycle.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

CHAPTER 1 EXERCISE: Answer questions 1-8 by filling in the spaces provided. Check your responses against those listed at the end of this chapter.

1. What are the seven purposes of an amphibious raid?

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

   f. _____

   g. _____

2. What are the two basic differences between an amphibious raid and an amphibious assault?

   a. _____

   b. _____

3. What are the five intelligence requirements for an amphibious raid?

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

4. What are the nine steps in planning an amphibious raid?

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

   f. _____

   g. _____

   h. _____

   i. _____

5. What are the five functional elements of a raid force?

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

6. What are the two kinds of amphibious raids?

   a. _____

   b. _____

7. What is the basic concept of logistic support for an amphibious raid?

   _____

   _____

8. What are eight principles of the amphibious raid?

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

   f. _____

   g. _____

   h. _____

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Chapter 1 Exercise Solutions

Question	Answer	Reference
1.	a. Reconnaissance b. Harassment c. Destruction d. Evacuating/Capture e. Diversion f. Psychological g. Unconditional Warfare	1103 a-g
2.	a. Short duration b. Includes a planned withdrawal from the objective.	1102
3.	a. Terrain b. Weather c. Hydrography d. Enemy situation e. Enemy Reaction Capabilities	1111b.
4.	a. Study all available information b. Plan attack of the target c. Plan movement from landing zone or beach to the target d. Plan withdrawal e. Plan ship-to-shore movement f. Plan embarkation and movement to OA g. Plan reembarkation h. Plan supporting fires i. Prepare task organization and equipment list	1113c.
5.	a. Command/control element b. Reconnaissance/security element c. Assault element d. Covering element e. Reserve element	1110d.
6.	a. In support of other operations b. As a separate operation	1103
7.	Provide the minimum essential supplies required to accomplish the mission	1122
8.	a. Make plans jointly b. Train and rehearse raiding force continually c. Develop extensive intelligence d. Simplify the plan e. Economize use of forces f. Satisfy communications needs g. Plan fire power similar to amphibious assault h. Combine surprise with speed	1108 a-h

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

APPENDIX A

RAID EXERCISE CHECKLIST

1. BACKGROUND. This checklist provides a detailed list for unit commanders conducting a raid. The concept is simply an "accomplished" or "not accomplished" list with qualitative remarks not entered. Some items are not applicable. This checklist should not be construed as an end all, but as an aid in planning and execution.

2. CHECKLIST	YES	NO
a. Intelligence		
(1) Has hostile electronic warfare (EW) capability been considered by raiding force planners?	____	____
(2) Does the enemy have beaconing capability if helo's are used?	____	____
(3) Are ITT's required?	____	____
If so, have they been included in task organizations?	____	____
(4) Has recon been employed effectively?	____	____
(5) Have weather conditions been evaluated?	____	____
(6) Have aerial photos been provided?	____	____
Are they timely and accurate?	____	____
(7) Have last minute intelligence summaries (INTSUMS) been given to the raid force?	____	____
(8) Is there a plan to search enemy KIA's for information including removing rank insignia of those enemy with info?	____	____
b. Communication		
(1) Have all required key items been drawn?	____	____
(2) If CMS material was drawn, was security increased at rehearsal site?	____	____
(3) Are HF radios required?	____	____
If so, who provides personnel to operate?	____	____
(4) Have radio assets of boat commander/helo commanders been checked?	____	____
(5) Have alternative means of communication been provided between forces in the OA?	____	____
c. Logistics		
(1) Have food stuffs been provided in the rehearsal area?	____	____
(2) Does the rehearsal area have a covered area for raid commander briefings?	____	____
(3) If vehicles are used, has POL and maintenance of vehicles been checked?	____	____
(4) Has coordination for ammunition been accomplished?	____	____

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

	YES	NO
(5) Is raid force ammo staged for raid force usage near rehearsal or embarkation site?	____	____
(6) Has prescribed load been issued?	____	____
(7) Has any dangerous cargo been loaded with boat/helo teams?	____	____
(8) Is fording gear required for vehicles?	____	____
(9) Has a limited technical inspection (LTI) and op check been conducted on all communications assets?	____	____
(10) Are communication vehicles required?	____	____
(11) Have spare frequencies been issued?	____	____
(12) Has EMCON been considered en route to OA?	____	____
(13) Have KY-38s/KY-57's been considered for used in the OA?	____	____
(14) Does the raid force avoid carrying key lists?	____	____
(15) Have BA4386's been tested?	____	____
(16) Are sufficient radios/handsets/antennas carried to replace those broken during rehearsals?	____	____
(17) Has the execution of the raid been timed, coordinated, rehearsed sufficiently to allow the assault to precede with least possible transmissions?	____	____
d. Training/Rehearsal RZO/LTI		
(1) Have LTI/RZO been conducted?	____	____
(2) Were rehearsal sites adequate?	____	____
(3) Have weapons going on the raid been evaluated in regards to contributing toward mission accomplishment?	____	____
(4) Has the unit task organized for the particular mission situation?	____	____
(5) Are snipers employed?	____	____
If so, have they fired with starlight scopes?	____	____
(6) Has engineer support been requested?	____	____
(7) Did training for all personnel include:		
(a) Embark and debark.	____	____
(b) Fire and movement.	____	____
(c) Sniper fire.	____	____
(d) Physical conditioning.	____	____
(e) Complete rehearsal.	____	____
(f) Rules of engagement.	____	____
(g) Training in use of special equipment.	____	____
(h) Weapons on safe before embarking.	____	____

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

	YES	NO
(8) Has company patrol order been issued?	____	____
(9) Did subordinate commanders issue orders?	____	____
(10) Have adequate signals (PYRO) been developed for EMCON during operation?	____	____
(11) Have land navigation techniques been reviewed?	____	____
(12) Has an escape and evasion plan been developed?	____	____
(13) Have gas masks been inspected and combat filters issued?	____	____
(14) Has training been conducted if required for an NBC environment?	____	____
(15) Are loud speakers employed by ground or air element to give instructions to hostages?	____	____
(16) Have supporting arms (CAS/NGF) been requested and/or plans made for prearranged/on-call fires?	____	____
(17) Have CAP and CAS been considered?	____	____
(18) Have supporting arms been considered for fire suppression?	____	____
(19) Have alternate plans been developed?	____	____
(20) Are security elements set up to handle:		
(a) KIA's.	____	____
(b) WIA's.	____	____
(c) Hostages (friendly).	____	____
(d) POW's.	____	____
(e) Interrogation.	____	____
(21) Has a terrain board been made?	____	____
(22) Have E&E plans been explained to all of the raid force?	____	____
(23) If life preservers are to be dropped on beach, are their positions marked?	____	____
(24) Does the force have rally points for withdrawal?	____	____
(25) Does the withdrawal force understand accountability of personnel procedures?	____	____
(26) Has the security force been provided with stretchers or a suitable replacement?	____	____
(27) Do all elements have plans to remove casualties?	____	____
If so, does the route provide cover and/or covering forces?	____	____
(28) Has organization of the beach been considered for the withdrawal to prevent disorganization before embarking?	____	____
(29) Have unit corpsmen been given specific instructions as to casualty evacuation?	____	____

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

	YES	NO
(30) Have Navy personnel been briefed concerning scheme of maneuver and beach signals?	____	____
(31) Upon returning to landing craft have weapons been returned to safe?	____	____
(32) Have all unit commanders given personnel reports to the raid commander?	____	____
(33) Has a debrief been conducted by the unit commander with all element leaders?	____	____
(34) Did the debrief give specifics and not general comments such as very good or unsatisfactory?	____	____
e. Special Equipment		
(1) Have shotguns been provided for guards at the rehearsal site?	____	____
(2) Are strobe lights required?	____	____
(3) Are any air mattresses required by raid force?	____	____
(4) Has sniper ammo been ordered?	____	____
(5) Have CS grenades been issued if to be used?	____	____
(6) Are binoculars required?	____	____
f. Administration		
(1) Have enemy handling procedures been developed?	____	____
(2) Has 782 gear been checked for serviceability?	____	____
(3) Are all members wearing dog tags/ID cards?	____	____
(4) Do those personnel requiring eye glasses have an extra set?	____	____
(5) Are RED's and wills up to date?	____	____
(6) Have the following personnel been identified?	____	____
(a) 17 year olds.	____	____
(b) Sole surviving son.	____	____
(c) Thrice wounded.	____	____
(d) Pending medical evaluation.	____	____
(7) Have shots been given for the particular OA; if required?	____	____
(8) Have pay authorization forms for dependents been completed?	____	____
(9) Does the company have a serialized listing of all weapons?	____	____
(10) For those Marines not assigned to the raid force has someone been assigned duty as NCOIC?	____	____
If not, have they been given TAD orders to another command?	____	____

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

THE MAKIN RAID
by MGen O. F. Peatross, USMC (Ret.)

Reprinted with permission from the
Marine Corps GAZZETTE.

A true "force-in-readiness" is ready for anything on a moment's notice. One risk to instant response is the lack of time to plan. A good contingency plan reduces the risk by anticipating command decisions necessary to a given operation in a given place. When the word "Go" comes, the plan needs only to be polished for the particular job at hand.

What happens when there is no contingency plan? As time and space factors become ever smaller in a shrinking world, the likelihood of not having a contingency plan becomes even greater. What can a commander do if he is committed to a small operation for which there is no preconceived plan?

First, he can study the history of small-unit operations, and then plan, train, rehearse and stay prepared to execute.

Let's dispel the belief that a Marine can do anything. Given the means, he can come to grips with the problem as good as anybody. The military team made up of graduates of The Basic School and of recruit training is the greatest combat combination we know how to produce. But, this alone is not great enough.

For example, how many Marines in a combat unit can speak or write the major languages? What communications do you need to task organize a rifle company to communicate with a base located hundreds of miles away? What do you do if you cannot withdraw from the objective, lose communicatins or are missing personnel? Questions like these are endless. Further, there can be few accurate answers to all such questions until a specific operation is planned and executed.

When time is the key factor, there isn't enough of it for rehearsals, conferences, meetings and the like. The initial problem then boils down to expeditiously utilizing the skills and equipment available at the division level to do the task organizing and equipping at the company or battalion levels. Because task organizing small units to operate alone involves several echelons of commands and staffs, it is not reasonable to expect a company or battalion commander to quickly solve such problems. Consequently, higher levels of command can have several task organizations and equipment for small units available in the files so that when the mission is received and you have just a few hours before moving out, the best task organization and equipment for the task can be taken from the files and placed in the hands of the unit commander. After moving out, the commander is on his own, relying on his own military experiences. The best way to gain experience and to gain insight is to study operations such as raids on Dieppe and Makin, and rescue operations such as Entebbe and the *Mayaguez*.

Let's consider the Makin Raid.

When the British became involved in World War II, the first new combat organization created was the commando. It was a defensive unit strategically, using offensive raids to keep the enemy upset. This organization was admired by both Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Consequently, when the United States became involved in World War II, President Roosevelt directed that similar units be organized in the Marine Corps. Two raider battalions were organized in February 1942, one on each coast. The 2d Raiders, on the west coast, moved out to the Pacific Fleet and on to Camp Catlin, Honolulu, Oahu.

The 2d Raiders were training and concurrently being alerted during the early Pacific operations, some as far away from Oahu as the Coral Sea Battle, May 1942. Then, also in May, after the Coral Sea Battle, Companies C and D were moved to Midway and attached to the 6th Defense Battalion during the Battle of Midway. Companies A and B were in an alert during the Battle of Midway and moved aboard amphibious destroyers (APD's) to Midway shortly after the battle, and then on northward to near the Aleutians. Although the Japanese had already landed in the Aleutians, Companies A and B were never committed and returned to Camp Catlin on the 4th of July. Shortly thereafter these two companies began preparing for the Makin Raid, which was to be conducted from submarines.

Here is a first person review of the events leading to the Makin Raid.

Liaison was established with the Submarine Forces, Pacific Fleet, and the troops and cargo characteristics of the three biggest submarines in the fleet were provided so we could begin testing and training to determine how many people and how much equipment we would need and could take aboard. We quickly concluded that we could take one company of 137 men and its needed equipment aboard one large submarine. Consequently, to transport two companies, a greatly reduced battalion headquarters and the commodore and his staff, would require all three submarines. We ended up with two, The *Argonaut* and the *Nautilus*. Accordingly, the size of the raiding force was reduced from the original plan of about 300 to 223.

At Barber's Point, Oahu (selected because of its hydrographic likeness to the objective), we conducted a few days of concentrated ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship training. The landing craft used was our old standby, the so-called 10-man rubber boat equipped with a carbon dioxide inflation tank, an outboard motor, a five-gallon fuel can and one paddle per man.

Two buoys were anchored offshore representing the two submarines. Our boat teams trained between the buoys and the beach for every possible eventuality—so we thought at the time—by boating through the surf with and without paddles, with and without motors, with full teams and with reduced teams, with full equipment and no equipment at all and in combinations of these.

Although we did not know the name of our target, we had a map of it that was made from photographs taken a few months back, on 1 February, when Naval Task Forces 8 and 17 conducted their aerial attack against Japanese installations in the Marshall and Gilbert islands. With the help of the map, major installations were roughly laid out with strips of target cloth, and full rehearsals were conducted from the buoys to the beach and inland.

On 1 August 1942, Company B embarked in *Nautilus* while Company A and the battalion command group, less LtCol Evans Carlson, were embarked in *Argonaut*. A rubber boat from *Argonaut* was to pick up Carlson, the landing force commander, and his runner from the deck of *Nautilus* and take them to the rendezvous area assigned to the command group. This way Carlson could pass the word to Company A and to his staff of any last minute changes that had been made.

On the night of 2 August, we had a full rehearsal, landing on the beaches at Barber's Point. All went as planned.

Upon returning to camp, I talked with Lt Jerry Holtom, intelligence officer and language officer of the battalion. Jerry had just returned from Palmyra and Christmas islands where he interrogated a fisherman who had recently been picked up offshore at Makin by a U.S. submarine and taken to Palmyra Island. From the fisherman Jerry had obtained a great deal of information.

The next day we reloaded our equipment, embarked our personnel the following day and sailed.

Although close in size, *Nautilus* lacked the troop space of *Argonaut*. *Argonaut* was primarily a mine-laying submarine, and the space normally occupied by the mines was converted to troop and cargo spaces. *Nautilus* was transporting 100 raiders and *Argonaut* 120. *Argonaut* had 100 members of Company A and 20 from the battalion command group and 2d Platoon, Company B.

Raiders were sleeping all over *Nautilus*. Their gear was stowed in any available space. Rubber boats were lashed on the outside, fuel cans were stowed in the torpedo tubes, and medical and other valuable equipment were stowed inside. Places to sleep were at a

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

premium and many "hot bedded." I slept on the transom (sofa) in the small, small wardroom. The enlisted galley ran around the clock. Boat teams conducted physical training at night.

After being underway a few days, we learned of the landing at Guadalcanal on August 7 and the fact that we were part of that overall operation. The task group commander explained that Guadalcanal was the first offensive operation that our country had conducted, and that it was a vital one. In fact, he said, it was essential to the security of the sea lanes and thus to the lifelines between Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. The landing force was the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced).

We were not certain of how quickly the Japanese would react to the landing. If a rapid reaction, it would take about 10 days to gather any sizable force; its elements could be loaded and at sea anywhere from one to three days later. The Gilbert Island area was selected for our raid because this area held the deepest enemy penetration toward the United States. We thought of many places we could raid; not one was as realistic as the Gilbert Islands. This we were told was why Makin was our target. D-day would be 17 August. This was the first time that I had heard the name of the objective of our raid.

As scheduled, we arrived offshore of Makin on Sunday 16 August, one day ahead of *Argonaut*. This day was spent reconnoitering at periscope depth. All officers and noncommissioned officers got a chance to look at the landing beaches.

As planned, a few hours after sunset *Argonaut* surfaced several hundred yards to our left. Our scheme of maneuver was simple: Company A, followed by the command group, would land on the left of the island, cross it, turn right and advance down the coastal road. Company B was to land on the right of the island, cross it, turn left and advance down the coastal road, meeting Company A at the church.

Shortly after midnight, the personnel began to stir and soon debarkation commenced. Although each man handling the hose at the inflation station had been trained for that job, one of them goofed and canted the hose a few degrees. This caused the pressurized air to make a screeching noise that could be heard several hundred yards away. At this point the inflation was almost completed, but the boat that was to come from *Argonaut* to pick up Col Carlson and his runner, was late. I was directed to take the colonel and his runner to the rendezvous area of *Argonaut*. This was accomplished despite rough sea and a heavy rain.

Upon returning to *Nautilus*, there were no rubber boats to be seen. According to our plan, we were to motor off at a right angle from the port side of the submarine. This would start us in the right direction to our beach. Since the submarine had been moved and we did not know it, this direction now took us out to sea, toward Pearl Harbor. After detecting this, we returned to *Nautilus*. Knowing that the magnetic compass functioned improperly near the metal hull of the submarine, I asked the skipper to give me the direction to the beach, and he gave me a magnetic compass direction in degrees. My response to him was, "don't give me an azimuth, just point!" He did and we motored off in that direction. By this time the rain had stopped; the clouds were breaking up; daylight was breaking through. We landed about where we were supposed to land. However, down the beach to our left we could see a rubber boat. We quickly headed in that direction. Upon reaching the boat, we found it loaded with medical supplies. We pulled it into the bushes and camouflaged it. From this spot we saw another boat farther down the beach. It was loaded with a machine gun and ammunition. We pulled this one off the beach and camouflaged it.

Radio silence was to be lifted after firing had commenced. At this time there had been no firing. We had seen no other raiders, no Japanese and no natives. I decided that our best bet was to move down the beach, cut across the island and meet 1st Platoon, Company A as called for

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

in the order. As there had been no firing, I felt Company A had already reached its objective.

While passing the rifle range, a burst of fire from a Browning automatic rifle rang out. We immediately activated our radio, but it did not work.

Being very close to the church, we continued on in that direction. As we were approaching the barracks, located near the church, all hell broke loose about a half mile to our right on the coastal road. An armed Japanese, startled by the gunfire, burst from the barracks. He was killed.

We advanced quickly into the barracks and found them empty but cluttered as one would expect after a hasty departure. By this time, to our right on the coastal road—the one and only road—firing was intense. We moved a few yards to the road. We could see Japanese activity down the road to our right, about 400 yards away. While observing, we saw a Japanese come out of the bushes, sling his rifle, mount his bicycle and pedal in our direction. He was killed. Shortly, at intervals, two more bicyclists tried to speed past us. None got by. A small car coming from the same area passed us at full speed. Apparently untouched by our firing it zoomed on down the road.

We moved on to the church, but Company A was not there. Then we advanced toward the firing, astride the road, with a fire team near the lagoon shore. The first house we came to was obviously the Japanese command post. It was empty of people. On the first floor, exactly as described by the fisherman with whom Lt Holtom had talked, was the communications equipment and a safe. All we could hear on the radio was Japanese. My radioman ran the gamut of frequencies. Several attempts to contact our company and battalion headquarters failed. We left the radio intact, however, because we thought we might be able to use it later. We managed to open the safe. It contained nothing but Japanese money.

From the second floor of the house we could sense from the firing the rough location of the Japanese and our own forces. We could see raiders out on Government Wharf. As we were located about 1,500 yards from the wharf, we felt that we could get through to our own forces. However, before making an attempt to push through, we needed to know what was on the other end of the island where Company A was suppose to land.

One fire team was sent down the road to reconnoiter. After about an hour, it returned, having seen neither Raiders nor Japanese. The only Japanese they saw, were the two in the car that we had fired at. It had gone down the road, missed a curve and crashed.

Knowing this, we tried to push through to our own forces. We advanced only a few yards to the next house, and here the man that the fisherman had labeled as a spy walked out on his porch. To us it looked as though he made a hand signal toward the spot from which the bicyclemen and the car had come. Shortly afterwards, heavy firing suddenly broke loose all around us. There followed a heavy exchange of fire, during which the so-called spy was shot.

We moved back again to the command post house, again tried the Japanese and our own radio with no luck. While attempting to communicate, we spotted a machine gun firing from its position between the coast road and the lagoon. We attacked the gun, one fire team leading the way. A field music, retrained as a Thompson sub-machine gun man crawled to within a few yards of the gun before it was turned on him. Although hit several times, he managed to crawl close enough to the gun to knock it out.

In addition to the machine gun, there were several riflemen firing at us. There was a heated exchange of fire before the riflemen were killed. Except for an occasional rifle shot coming in our direction, it again became relatively quiet. By the time I reached the field music, he was dead. Two other Marines had been wounded, but were able to walk. Another had been pinned down by machine gun and rifle fire for about 30 minutes; from the way bullets were hitting near him, I thought for certain that he would be dead. Although he had been grazed by bullets and had a bandolier shot off his back, he was able to get up and to move on. Our platoon guide had been badly shot, but was able to walk. The squad leader was killed as was my radio operator. Others had minor wounds.

Once again we moved to the rear of the command post house and gathered our wits. I decided that we should get our information to Col Carlson and also hold the enemy where we had him. The plan was to advance down the road to an area where a truck and a motorcycle with side car were parked. A two-man patrol would take the reverse of the same route that we had gone over along the beach on our way in, one man to move inland from the ocean and the other along the beach.

Just prior to our moving out, natives, numbering about 75 and consisting of women and children and a few old men, came walking

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



Refer to map, page 90.

slowly toward us from the area where the heavy fighting was taking place. Their leader could speak some English. From him we learned the locations of the Japanese and of our own forces.

More than seven hours of daylight had passed. The rest of the day did not go unnoticed, however, as the sound of Japanese aircraft could be heard and soon they were overhead. About two hours earlier, we had heard Japanese reconnaissance aircraft nearby and had expected more aircraft to come. About 1300, a flight of 12 planes strafed and bombed from one end of the coastal road to the other. They dropped bombs all over the area. We took cover in some vegetable beds which were about two feet below the surface of the natural ground. Although several bombs hit near us, nobody was hurt. As suddenly as they came, they flew away except for two planes, one a four-motored flying boat and the other a small seaplane. These two planes landed in the lagoon and were taken under fire by a considerable number of weapons being fired by our main body. The small plane caught fire and burned. The four-motored plane tried to take off and crashed.

It was now past mid-afternoon and time was running out on us. We decided to destroy everything that was serviceable to the enemy. We then made our farthest advance toward the enemy and our own forces, about 300 yards beyond the command post house. Here we found a Japanese truck loaded with ammo stalled in the middle of the road. We riddled its gas tank. Shortly afterward, the whole truck was aflame, and its rubber tires sent up a high column of black smoke. After a half-hour or so, the Japanese bombers came back again. This time, however, they concentrated on the area of the burning truck. The first bomb hit close to us, but the rest hit close to the truck and in and around where the Japanese were located.

Before we started back to the beach, we destroyed the Japanese radios and telephone lines.

Our advance across the island and back to our boat was uneventful. We found the boat in good shape, inflated it and carried it to the edge of the bushes on the beach. As we had been taught in training, we watched the surf for about 15 minutes. The waves were coming in much faster than they did at Barber's Point, but the surf was not nearly as high. We counted the waves coming in looking for that fifth wave that is usually smaller than the rest. We watched the cycle repeat itself several times, checking the timing of the small wave's arrival. Additionally, we reorganized our boat assignments. Of our group of 13, three had been killed, one had hopefully rejoined the main body and seven of the remaining were wounded, but all could walk.

At the proper moment we dragged our boat across the beach and into the water. Upon reaching the surf, the port and starboard pairs climbed aboard, grabbed paddles and began

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

pushing us to sea. A Marine got the motor started and we motored and paddled through all of the speedy waves. As we went through the last breaker, I was thrown out of the boat, but was quickly helped back aboard. This was the only time that I had ever been thrown out of a boat. Aside from the normal things, such as weaponry, tactics, camouflage, I could only think that physical training now seemed paramount. We could have had all the training that anybody had to offer, but if we had not been as physically fit as we were at that moment, we would have never made it through the surf.

At 1945, *Nautilus* was to turn on a green light and *Argonaut* a red one. After 15 minutes or so in the ocean, we sighted the green light and soon motored alongside our submarine. Ours was the only boat back. I went below and briefed the commander. I learned that the submarine was not in communication with the forces ashore.

After about an hour the first boat from the main body came alongside. The senior Marine aboard, after a few minutes rest, gave me a report. What he told me was startling. He said everybody was having a "hell'va" time trying to get off the beach and through the surf. He explained that every boat had turned over at least a half-dozen times or more. About 50 wounded Marines were scattered up and down the beach and some of them had drowned.

Two doctors, he reported, had been busy all day. The situation had reached a point where there were not enough ablebodied men to get the seriously wounded through the surf. As a result, the wounded had been collected and placed in a holding area. Weapons were picked up from the beach, loaded and given to those who were physically able to fire them. Those with lesser wounds were located a few yards from the stretcher cases, providing security while the doctors and the corpsmen performed life-saving and temporary treatment. Overall, it was a bleak situation. How bleak I would soon learn.

The oral report continued. Carlson, had made the decision to surrender, stating that the strong could attempt to make their own way through the surf, but he would stay with the wounded.

Carlson dictated the surrender note to the Company B commander. In surrendering, however, there was a language problem to overcome, because the only interpreter on the raid, had been killed. A corporal who could speak and understand enough of the language to make the surrender was located.

While this was going on, four Japanese made their way to the edge of the stretcher cases and shot a wounded Marine before they themselves were killed. This assault made the situation appear worse than it was. Carlson finished dictating the note and sent the corporal to execute the surrender.

Later, two more boats returned, the occupants reporting the same bad situation. Just prior to light I was directed to gather all the equipment needed ashore and be prepared to send about five men back with the equipment. The submarines would not leave the area until every Marine was back aboard. If these five men did not turn the tide, every man, sailor and Marine, would go ashore next. At 10 minutes past seven, the boat shoved off.

Meanwhile, the submarine was blinking a message to Carlson ashore. The radar had picked up Japanese aircraft about 30 miles away. While the chief and I were securing the fuel rack into the torpedo tube, the submarine skipper was giving us a reading on the location of the aircraft. My job was finished when the aircraft were a few miles away. I ran to the hatch and jumped down, and the chief quickly followed. The hatch was secured, and the submarine dived.

In the wardroom, I joined the sub's engineer. Before the dive was finished, the Japanese sighted our submarine, and bombed it. The bombs shook the submarine, and the lights went out. The engineer made a beeline to the fuse box, and in seconds the lights came on again. I was relieved, because a power loss would mean that the submarine would drown. Fortunately, we were bombed with personnel bombs which detonated upon striking the surface of the water.

Cruising at periscope depth a few minutes every hour, we could see the planes bombing and strafing.

Shortly after dark, we received our first message from Col Carlson. He was moving the rubber boats across the island, withdrawing on the lagoon side through the lagoon passage at about 2130 hours. At 2308, 72 raiders, loaded aboard native boats and our rubber boats, returned to the subs. The two doctors divided the wounded between the subs. They were bedded in the officers' bunks.

The first man on the operating table had been wounded in the leg, arm, shoulder and chest, and had lost a lot of blood. Two other corpsmen dressed minor wounds and took care of the seriously wounded waiting to be operated on. After 20 hours of operating, the

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

operating room was secured.

Prior to departing the area, a hasty count was made of the personnel. As there had been a mix of personnel, no single person had total knowledge of the killed, wounded or the missing. After checking and rechecking, there were nine Raiders unaccounted for. Five of the nine were the five I had sent back to shore. The other four had been seen last under varying circumstances.

Nobody senior to me ever mentioned the word "surrender" to me. When my curiosity got the best of me, I got the story from the young corporal who was sent to deliver the surrender note. He said he had walked down the road in search of somebody to surrender to. After entering a couple of houses that were empty, he entered one that had an old man and women in the front room. In the next room he saw a Japanese with a rifle who did not attempt to use it, because he was in a state of shock. After an exchange of phrases, the Marine felt that he had been understood and gave him the note. The Japanese departed the house and went down the road. The corporal expected him to return in about 30 minutes. After waiting about an hour or so, he went looking for the Japanese. After a rather extensive search, he found neither that man nor any other Japanese. He returned to Carlson and reported this information to him.

This good news gave life and new spirit to everybody. They gathered weapons and ammunition off the beach and located demolitions. With help from the natives, they went down the coastal road, all the way to the other end of the island, destroying all enemy installations, searching for our dead and wounded and for the Japanese who had their surrender note. They never found him.

They located our dead and made arrangements with the natives for burial. They located native outriggers and the natives to operate them. They moved four rubber boats, paddles and two motors across the island to the lagoon side. About 2030, with four rubber boats lashed to the outriggers and using two outboard motors, 72 raiders, many of them wounded, and a few natives slowly made it out of the lagoon and through the lagoon passage on to the submarines.

After some rest, Carlson talked about the high points and low points of the raid. He said that his high point of the first day was talking with the raider whom I had sent to report our action. The low point of the entire raid was the night of D-day when no boats could make it through the surf. This, however, was followed with the high point of the entire operation when his patrol could not find any live Japanese on the island.

Carlson explained to the task group commander that his group had counted 84 Japanese dead, two planes and two ships destroyed. The ships were destroyed by the submarines firing over the island into the lagoon where the ships were located. All enemy installations and supplies were also destroyed. Altogether, about 160 Japanese had been killed.

On 26 August, *Nautilus* arrived back at Pearl Harbor and two days later *Argonaut* arrived.

The fate of the nine missing was not fully known until after the end of World War II. In November of 1943 when Makin was recaptured, it was learned that the senior of the nine had contacted a priest on the island and made arrangements to surrender on 30 August, but only as prisoners first class. The Japanese had returned to the island on the 19th. On the 30th, the raiders surrendered as per agreement as prisoners first class. They were moved to Kwajalein Island on 2 September, and were treated as prisoners first class until their execution on 16 October.

A Marshallese native of Jelait Island, Lejena Lokot, who was working in the kitchen, was asked to take a table to the spot where the execution took place. Upon departing the area, he hid in the bushes and watched the beheading of the first raider. After the war's end, he reported what he had seen. As a result VAdm Koso Abe, Capt Yoshio Obara and LCdr Hisakichi Naiki, all of the Imperial Japanese Navy, were taken from their homes in Japan, brought to Guam and tried for their crimes. Found guilty, the admiral was sentenced to death and hanged on 19 June 1947. Obara and Hisakichi Naiki were sentenced to imprisonment, 10 and five years respectively.

The mission of the raiders was to land, capture or kill the enemy, destroy his installations and withdraw. From the fleet point of view, the mission was to divert enemy forces from the Guadalcanal area and to deceive the enemy of our actual plans. These missions were accomplished. Japanese troops were poured into the Central Pacific, some to islands such as Tarawa where no Japanese had been before. Likely, these Japanese forces would have gone on to Guadalcanal had it not been for the raid. At the time (October-December 1942) in the Guadalcanal area, operations for the Pacific Fleet became as critical as they would ever be in

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

all of World War II. Consequently, that thin line of victory over defeat at Guadalcanal might have been assisted in no small way by the Makin Raid.

Many lessons were learned from the Makin Raid. Those mentioned below are of concern in a raid, a rescue or an operation by a small unit that is conducted a long distance from its parent headquarters:

► Plans for primary and alternate means of communicating within and outside the landing force, including electronic, visual, sound, as well as vehicular and foot messengers.

► Plans to include alternate locations of withdrawal to include immediate action and even a delayed rescue for any missing in action.

► Plans and practice in means and methods for timely accounting for personnel and sensitive equipment.

► Training in executing a plan upon little or no warning, with a shortage of personnel and with existing equipment.

► Simulate casualties in training, particularly among key leaders and in vital equipment.

► Assume that the action will take place outside of the United States and that the highest level of government will be demanding priority information.

► Stay physically fit, as such operations under the best of circumstances will be a physical strain far beyond an ordinary operation and, too, it might require movement over long distances afoot.

► Make contingency plans and train now, especially for small units of company size and smaller, being certain to include personnel such as language specialists and equipment such as communications that are not found normally in the small units.

Lastly, a repeat of an old, old lesson which was also written by Col Carlson in his after action report:

> Finally, I would invite the attention of all military leaders to the illustration provided by our situation at Makin on the night of August 17th which emphasizes a truth that is as old as the military profession: no matter how bad your own situation may appear to be, there is always the possibility that the situation of the enemy is much worse. USMC

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

"Reprinted from Proceedings by permission:
copyright © (1946) U.S. Naval Institute".

THE MAKIN ISLAND RAID[1]

By CAPTAIN WALTER KARIG, *U. S. Naval Reserve, and*
COMMANDER ERIC PURDON, *U. S. Naval Reserve*

IT WAS D-Day plus One in the Solomons. Three thousand miles away two submarines passed Hospital Point, Pearl Harbor, and headed out to sea.

Submarines often had silently left Hawaii and had as silently returned, their conning towers emblazoned with miniature Japanese flags, since the first days of the war. They would until the last. But none had left with such a cargo as these two on that August 8 of 1942.

A plane on patrol swooped low over the pair. To the pilot as he waggled his wings in a gesture of "Good Hunting!" they were as other submarines he had seen taking the great circle route westward. Could he have seen below those narrow decks into the strong pressure hulls, he would have snorted "what the hell are those 'asterisk' Marines up to now?"

For there *were* Marines in the two submarines—two hundred and twenty-two of them. But they weren't taking over submarines, they were being taken by them—on a foray unique in American naval history.

This naval task force of submarines, *Argonaut* and *Nautilus*, was to carry out a daring raid on Makin Island, strategic atoll in the Marshalls. The purpose was manifold: to divert the enemy's preoccupation with the Solomon's invasion, to destroy installations and the Japanese garrison, and to secure, if possible, intelligence from prisoners and documents. The Second Marine Raider Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson, was assigned the job.

For eight days the submarines sailed eastward. It was hot and cramped in the close quarters. The temperature of the sea itself was 80°, and although extra air-conditioning units had been installed, the temperature inside the submarines was raised over 90° and the humidity to 85 per cent by the sweating bodies of the jam-packed men. All torpedoes had been removed, except for those in the tubes, and bunks had been built in the forward and after torpedo rooms. To fit that many men in, the space between these bunks was so limited that if a man wanted to turn over, he had to slide out of his bed and crawl back up the other side!

Fortunately the weather was good, and so the men were able to go topside for exercise and fresh air, twice a day. A submarine is most vulnerable on the surface, so these periods—once in the morning and once at night—were timed carefully. It took four minutes for the marines to get on deck, and three minutes for them to get below again. They were allowed ten minutes in the fresh air. As they got within the radius of aircraft search of Makin, the morning airings were discontinued, but even until the night before the attack, the evening "breathers" were kept up. And as a result, the Marines reached their objective in excellent physical condition, although in a state of temper that boded ill for the Japs.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Meals, too, were a problem. The galleys were in constant operation. Each meal required three and a half hours to serve, and baking had to be done at night. The men ate two meals a day, with crackers and soup at noon.

Each submarine headed toward Makin independently. Should the two submarines be detected by the enemy together, suspicions would be bred of an expedition in force. On the other hand, separated they could be evaluated only as submarines going to individual patrol stations.

The *Nautilus*, being the swifter of the two boats, was to go ahead as fast as possible and to make a periscope reconnaissance of the island before the day of the landing. It was to assay the preparations the Japanese might have made to forestall a landing, and to study the tides and currents around the atoll to insure a rapid and safe debarkation when the time came for the attack.

To do this, the *Nautilus* sped ahead, and on August 16, at three o'clock in the morning, she made landfall on Little Makin atoll.

Creeping slowly at periscope depth along Makin Island during the morning and early afternoon, taking landmarks such as Ukiangong Point on the south coast, and prominent trees, her commander plotted the tidal currents, and found them quite different from previous information. Immediately after dark he surfaced and, in the middle of a violent rain squall, made rendezvous with the *Argonaut* within fifteen minutes of the time originally scheduled.

"At the rendezvous," said the captain of the latter, "we exchanged supplementary operation instructions concerning the expedition and its extension to Little Makin and two other islands if the circumstances permitted. The submarines then proceeded in company to the prescribed landing point off Makin Island, arriving at about 2:30 in the morning. The disembarkation started about 3 o'clock and in weather which was less favorable than we had encountered during rehearsal . . . ."

For weeks the Marines had trained intensively at Midway and in the Hawaiian Islands. Night landings from submarines had been practiced on several occasions, as had the handling of rubber boats in surf.

The plan of attack called for all landing boats to assemble alongside the *Nautilus* so that they might get underway together for simultaneous landing on two separate beaches. The continuous noise from the wash of the swell through the *Nautilus'* limber holes, and the roar of the surf, made it almost impossible to hear orders. And added to this, most of the outboard motors refused to start, and the swell of the sea made it difficult to keep the bubble-like rubber boats alongside the submarine.

Colonel Carlson, in trying to get his boats straightened out, was all over the topside of the submarine to form up those that had motors running to tow in others, and also to divide his forces into the prearranged two groups. Because of the confusion, the colonel made a quick change of plans and word was passed that all boats were to land together in a body, and not at two separate beaches.

While this was going on, nobody noticed that Colonel Carlson's own boat had drifted off, its motor drowned. Here were the troops in their boats, and the general, or colonel in this case, on board ship! Trying to call a boat alongside, he couln't make himself heard above the noise of the sea.

The captain of the *Nautilus* finally was able, with a megaphone, to bring one of the boats alongside and disembarked the colonel and his runner. The boat was not his, and after delivering the colonel to his own boat, it returned to the ship for instructions as to its proper landing place.

Not knowing the last minute change of plans, the captain of the *Nautilus* directed this boat to its previously assigned landing beach. It was the only boat of that contingent supposed to land in the rear of the Japs that actually did so! The rest of them landed in front. But this boat load succeeded in raising so much Cain behind the Japs' flank that it materially helped the major attack.

The landings in all cases were made easily through the surf without being detected by the enemy. A guard was posted, the boats hidden in the undergrowth above the beach, and before dawn the two companies had completed reorganization into their units.

With the raiders on their way to the beach,

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

the two submarines got underway and moved four miles offshore, keeping contact with their former passengers by voice radio.

Despite the initial confusion in getting away from the submarines, the landing had gone well. Too well. For then the inevitable accident happened: an overeager Marine tested his rifle to see if it would work.

It did!

The alarm had been given and Colonel Carlson immediately sent Company A to cross the atoll, seize the road on the lagoon side, and then report where they were in respect to the wharves. Japanese defense positions, including a barb-wire fence, a portable "hedgehog" road block, and four machine guns, had been placed in an easterly direction across the island. But our Marines were able to overrun the installations before the Japs were able to man them. By 0545 Lieutenant Merwin C. Plumley reported from the government wharf that his company had taken the government house, without opposition.

Our landing in the Solomons, coupled with the air and naval attacks on Kiska ten days earlier, had disturbed and alerted the enemy on this little island. Natives, who were invariably friendly, told the Marines that maneuvers had been held by the defending forces in preparation for a raid, and snipers had strapped themselves to trees three days before our arrival.

The Japanese reveille the morning of August 17th was at 0600, and upon the alarm they had rushed from their barracks. But Company A had by this time been deployed across the island and was advancing south. Company B being held in reserve on the left flank. Shortly after contact was made with the Japanese on the lagoon road, near the native hospital, our advance was halted by machine gun fire from the right flank. Some of the Japanese had come up on bicycles, others came by truck. Fire from our anti-tank rifles forced the latter to unload about 300 yards down the road, and by 0630 we were heavily engaged.

Snipers were a main problem, at first. Strapped to the heavy foliage of the palm trees, their jungle-green camouflage suits were hard to detect, and often the snipers could only be killed by the uneconomical method of shooting away the fronds that concealed them. Others were found because they moved after their fire indicated their position. One ingeniously tied the tops of two palms together so that when he knew he had been spotted, he cut his trees apart, and the Marines didn't know in which one he was.

Our radiomen were targets for snipers if they were seen using phones, and officers brought enemy fire if they used their hands or arms to direct their men. Officers soon learned to use voice signals entirely. Not knowing the action of a Garand rifle proved dangerous ignorance to many a Jap. After a Marine had fired, a sniper would frequently raise his head to take air, thinking our rifle had bolt action. The raiders were quick to show him his error!

Natives, who had moved north from Butaritari village ahead of the Japanese, reported that the majority of the enemy was on On Chong's Wharf, with others near Ukiangong Point on the lakes. So Lieutenant Colonel Carlson asked the submarines to open fire with their deck guns on this region.

The *Nautilus*, then heading southwest, complied almost immediately. "We fired about twelve salvos into this area," said her captain. "During the firing however, no spots were received from the Marine observer because of communications difficulties. (The Jap was jamming our voice frequency.) We continued firing until the course of the submarines began to uncover the entrance to the lagoon. I then ordered a reversal of course, because our information led us to believe that the lagoon entrance was covered by a shore battery and I did not want to unmask this. Before we could complete reversal of course and again open fire on Ukiangong Point we received a request from Colonel Carlson to take under fire any ship in the lagoon 8,000 yards off On Chong's wharf. This we complied with, but receiving no spots concerning the fall of our shot into the lagoon, we moved the salvos in deflection and range to cover approximately the area concerned. Subsequently we learned that in laddering these salvos around in this manner, the Japanese ships had gotten underway, steamed around the lagoon with a view to avoid the shot, and had run into two salvos and had been sunk . . . ."

At 0902 the *Argonaut* suddenly submerged on a false plane contact and the *Nautilus* followed. They remained under water for about an hour, but shortly after resurfacing an enemy biplane was seen and the submarines went down again, staying this time for two hours.

On shore, the Marines were finding the going difficult. Here, as in the Solomons, the Japs fought to the last man, and the final wiping out had often to be done with knives.

A lieutenant with his unit of eleven men, which had landed behind the enemy, made the most of their opportunity to harass. Near the trading station they killed eight Japanese soldiers with the loss of three Marines. They burned a truck, destroyed a radio station, searched houses, and did other damage before struggling through the surf to the *Nautilus* that evening.

The Marines found willing allies on the island. The native police chief was handed a Garand to hold by a Marine, and he used it to kill two snipers. Some natives opened coconuts to relieve the men's thirst, while others carried ammunition for the machine gunners. They gave useful—if not always reliable—information as to the presence of isolated enemy groups.

At 1130 two Japanese Navy reconnaissance planes flew over Makin for about fifteen minutes and dropped two bombs before leaving. At 1255 the *Nautilus* surfaced, but had to crash dive immediately when 12 shore-based bombers were seen approaching. Both submarines remained submerged for the rest of the day.

In the afternoon an attempt was made by the Japanese to reinforce Makin, and two

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

planes carrying about 35 men landed in the lagoon. Both planes were destroyed by our machine gun fire.

During the day the Japanese attempted three counterattacks. After several minutes of yelling and shrieking to work up a fighting frame of mind, they came forward on the run, waving their rifles. Rifle fire quenched their exuberance, and in one instance a submachine gun killed eight Japs who came out bunched together. Warned by the noises, the Marines easily stopped these attacks.

In one instance the Japs gave us some welcome help. Before the last air attack at 1630 on August 17, the raiders had withdrawn about 200 yards in an attempt to lure the enemy from his positions. It didn't work, but when the Jap bombers came over they bombed the area most strongly held by their own men, causing many casualties.

Rendezvous with the submarines had been set at after 1830, and no later than 2100. So at 1700 Lieutenant Colonel Carlson ordered a slow retirement and by 1900 the raiders were back at the beach.

Leaving the island had been timed to coincide with high tide and darkness, so the submarines could get as close as possible to the beach. It was realized that the men would be exhausted after the day's heavy fighting, but the peculiar nature of the surf off the atoll had not been taken into account. The short, quick rollers made it virtually impossible to launch the rubber boats that had been dragged from the foliage where they had lain hidden all day. Gasoline motors refused to work, boats overturned, throwing men and equipment into the water. Even the loss of equipment and the jettisoning of motors didn't help any. Furious paddling, or swimming with the boats in tow, accomplished nothing.

Only 53 men in four boats reached the *Nautilus*, and three boats the *Argonaut* during the night. About 120 raiders had to stay all night on the rainy beach. Half-clothed, almost entirely unarmed, and in a state of complete exhaustion, they had reached, as Lieutenant Colonel Carlson said later, "the spiritual low point of the expedition."

The captain of the *Argonaut* decided to send the two reserve landing boats ashore to help in bringing the men back. A few available arms were gathered together and five Marines, chosen from volunteers, elected to take the equipment in and assure the Marine commander that the submarines would remain indefinitely to get the men off, except as forced by planes to submerge during the day.

At daybreak they started in, and at the same time four boats managed to get to the two submarines from shore. In one of them rode a tall, bald; be-spectacled Major—James Roosevelt, executive officer of the raiders and eldest son of the President. They just made it.

"Roosevelt was the last man out of the boat," said the captain of the *Argonaut*, "and had just barely gotten his tail feathers down when the first Jap plane came over and the *Argonaut* had to go under. If the plane had appeared fifteen or twenty seconds earlier, I'm afraid Major Jimmie would have been swimming around in the Pacific."

The planes severely strafed the volunteers' boat, and only one man managed to get his message through to Colonel Carlson by swimming.

The submarines remained submerged during the day.

Stranded ashore until nightfall, the Marines sent out patrols. Contrary to the impression received from the fighting the day before, it was found that few Japanese were still alive. Eighty-three enemy dead were counted, some near their machine guns and others behind palm trees which our guns had penetrated. Bodies were searched for papers, and equipment taken to rearm themselves. Only two snipers were encountered during the day; one near the north end of the atoll, and the other near On Chong's Wharf. Both were shot. The defense force had numbered, therefore, only about 90 men.

Marine casualties from the two days' fighting totalled 51, of whom 18 had been killed, including Captain Gerald P. Holtom, intelligence officer. Fourteen men were wounded, of whom two were officers. The missing totalled 12. Seven Marines were drowned trying to buck the surf.

Destruction of enemy installations included the firing of about 1,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, demolition of the main radio station at On Chong's Wharf, and the destruction of other facilities and stores. A

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

new-type machine gun mounted on a high and heavy tripod, apparently adaptable for anti-aircraft use, was found.

At dusk that night the submarines returned to the rendezvous, and Lieutenant Colonel Carlson signaled them to go to the lagoon entrance by 2130, as he thought the evacuation could be made more easily there.

The captain of the *Argonaut* was not satisfied that this message was bona fide. He had not received positive information that there were no shore batteries, and there was a possibility that the Japanese had taken Carlson prisoner and were forcing him under torture to decoy the submarines.

"He requested by blinker the acknowledgment of his request," he reported, "which I refused to give him until I was satisfied that it was actually Colonel Carlson. Consequently, I tried to send a message through to him on this order: The night before we had disembarked the raiders, at supper the Colonel and I had been talking over the fact that my father was a marine officer and had been head of the Adjutant Inspectors' Department of the Marine Corps. In the course of the conversation we had discussed who had relieved him, and I knew that he would remember this and that if he gave me a prompt reply, I could accept as a fact that the Japs were not putting the screws on him, and that it was, in effect, he.

"So I tried to get this message through: 'Who succeeded my father as A.N.I.?' I got the 'Who . . . ' out all right, but before I could go any further, I got a flash from the beach, 'Please acknowledge, this is Evans.'

"So I again started all over, and again he interrupted. Finally he gave up and waited. And I got the test question through. I had hardly got the last letter out before the flash came back from the beach, 'Squeegy!' That was the correct reply. The officer concerned was General 'Squeegy' Long of the Marine Corps. That was my way of identifying Colonel Carlson."

Only four landing boats were still serviceable and these were carried from the sea beach to the lagoon, where natives provided an outrigger in addition. These five boats were lashed together and the 70 Marines still remaining paddled out to the waiting submarines.

By midnight all the surviving Marines were aboard and the two submarines headed back for Pearl Harbor, the scarlet flames of the fired Japanese aviation stores reflecting redly in their wakes.

The submarines returned, as they had come, independently, the *Nautilus* entering Pearl Harbor on August 25th, and the *Argonaut* a day later.

Each submarine on the return trip had seven wounded Marines on board. The operations by the surgeons were carried out under the most difficult circumstances, with relatively crude arrangements. But such was the skill of the two surgeons that not one of the casualties subsequently died.

"To me," said the senior naval officer on the raid, "the most gratifying feature of this expedition was the spirit of cooperation between the raiders and the naval personnel. We trained the Marines to be lookouts, we gave them diving stations, and the crews of the submarines assisted in every way with the launching of the craft and the reassembly, reembarkation of the Marines upon their return. The crews and officers gave up their bunks to the wounded and to those Marines who were exhausted from their efforts ashore, and it is one of the greatest exhibitions I have seen of common self-sacrifice and helpfulness."

The success of the Makin expedition resulted from this willing cooperation. "Unity of mind and effort," as Lieutenant Colonel Carlson declared, welded the personnel of the submarines and raiders into an effective fighting team.

And it was eminently a successful expedition. It had caused a task force of Japanese cruisers, transports, and destroyers, en route to reinforce the Japanese on Guadalcanal, to change course for the Gilbert Islands. It gave us practical information about the enemy's fighting equipment and experience in a new type of warfare. The submarine, though uncomfortable, proved it could be used for transporting troops for long distances.

A new technique had been tested. These two trail-blazing submarines were to play a continuing part in harassing the enemy as our forces crept closer, in the months to come, to Japan itself.

*U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1987- 181-629:60041

95

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

COURSE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS - MCI - 7644 (1987)

a. Introduction.

To improve the instructional materials and methods of presentation in this course, we ask you to complete this questionnaire.

b. Methods of evaluation.

(1) Please make your written comments only in the space provided.

(2) If you circle "Strongly Disagree", please submit comments/recommendations or any other constructive criticism.

(3) Criteria.--Abbreviations in the columns represent these terms.

SA - Strongly Agree
A - Agree
U - Undecided
D - Disagree
SD - Strongly Disagree

c. Evaluation. Circle the appropriate abbreviation.

(1) I think the Purpose of this course has been fulfilled.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(2) I think that the learning objectives stated have been met.	SD	D	U	A	SA

My evaluation of the text follows:

(3) The method of presentation was appropriate to an officer of my MOS.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(4) The level of instruction was appropriate to an officer of my MOS.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(5) The examples used contributed to the learning process.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(6) My overall evaluation of the text is favorable.	SD	D	U	A	SA

My evaluation of testing procedures follows:

(7) The chapter exercise contributed to to the learning process.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(8) The course examination adequately measured understanding of material.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(9) My goals for taking this course have been attained.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(10) My overall evaluation of this course is favorable.	SD	D	U	A	SA

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

d. Comments and recommendations. Your comments and recommendations will be used during the rewrite of this course. All input is appreciated.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

e. How many hours, did it take for you to complete the course, including the final exam? _____

If you desire an answer to a specific question, use the request for instructional assistance form (Section F).

f. Please provide the following:

(1) RANK: _____

(2) MOS: _____

(3) CURRENT ASSIGNMENT: _____

g. If you have an instructional/administrative problem, please write it below. Be sure to include your name and address so that the appropriate division can answer your question.

Name: _____
SSN: _____
Address: _____
_____
_____
_____

Autovon Telephone: _____
Commercial Telephone: _____

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

STUDENT REQUEST/INQUIRY
MCI - R-11K

DATE SENT: _____

COURSE NUMBER COURSE TITLE

Section 1. Student Identification

RANK INITIALS LAST NAME MOS

SSN REPORT UNIT CODE (RUC)

MILITARY ADDRESS

___ _____

___ _____

___ _____

INSTRUCTIONS: Print or type name, rank, and address clearly. Included ZIP CODE. Only Class III Reservists may use civilian address.

- -

Section 2. Check the appropriate box and fill in the appropriate spaces. FOR REGULAR AND CLASS II RESERVE MARINES THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER OR HIS REPRESENTIVE, i.e. TRAINING OFFICER.

1. ☐ CHANGE. The following information needs correction:

	From	To
Name	_____	_____
Rank	_____	_____
SSN	_____	_____
RUC	_____	_____

2. ☐ MATERIALS. The following materials are needed: Lessons _____ Manual _____ Answer Sheets _____ Other _____

3. ☐ EXAM OVERDUE. The last lesson was sent in on _____.

4. ☐ MISSING RESULTS. The exam was sent in on _____. (If not received at MCI a new exam will be issued).

5. ☐ MISSING DIPLOMA. The course was completed in _____ 19____.

6. ☐ EXTEND. (Students are only eligible for one extension prior to their CCD).

7. ☐ REENROLL. (Students are only eligible for reenrollment once and only after their CCD. If already reenrolled and disenrolled, a new enrollment must be requested).

8. ☐ OTHER (EXPLAIN): _____

_____

NOTE: This form will not be returned by MCI. If the request is valid, transaction will show on next UAR or on MCI-R-1_ Form.

_____
SIGNATURE - TITLE OR RANK
(MUST BE CO OR REPRESENTATIVE)

- -

Student: Detach and retain this portion.

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(5 U. S. C. 522A)

1. AUTHORITY: Title 5, USC, Sec. 301. Use of your Social Security Number is authorized by Executive, Order 9397 of 22 Nov 43.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: The Student Request/Inquiry is used to transmit information concerning student participation in MCI courses.

3. ROUTINE USES: This information is used by MCI personnel to research student inquiries. In some cases information contained therein is used to update individual student records maintained by the Marine Corps Institute.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: Disclosure is voluntary. Failure to provide information may result in the provision of incomplete service to your inquiry. Failure to provide your Social Security Number will delay the processing of your inquiry request.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE